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Much has been written describing, analyzing and explaining
the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.1 It is charateristic
of this Act, and of most new Internal Revenue statutes, that the
uncertainties which arise in day to day planning decisions were
never foreseen or explained in the wealth of commentary which
accompanied the legislation. The passage of time has once again
proven to be a formidable testing ground.
This Article, divided into two sections, analyzes a few narrow
areas of the Reform Act which affect estate planning decisions.
The first section discusses charitable trusts and their treatment
under new private foundation provisions. Charitable remainder
trusts, with an emphasis on the positive apsects of the unitrust,
are discussed in the second section.
A. Definitions
Prior to the Reform Act, the term "charitable remainder
trusts" referred loosely to three types of trusts: (1) trusts paying
all income to charity in perpetuity; (2) trusts paying income to a
noncharitable beneficiary for life with the remainder to charity;
(3) trusts paying income to charity with the remainder to an-
other charity. The Reform Act, however, has renamed and reclas-
sified all trusts for charity, requiring the practitioner to enter a basic
definitional study.
The Reform Act divides trusts for charity into two generic
categories: exempt and nonexempt trusts. Exempt trusts are
1. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 573 (1969)
[hereinafter referred to as the Reform Act or the Act].
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trusts for charity which have applied and qualified for tax exemp-
tion under section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2
Nonexempt trusts are all other trusts for charity.3 Section 4947
subdivides nonexempt trusts into two classifications: charitable
trusts and split-interest trusts.4 In order to qualify as a charita-
ble trust under section 4947 (a) (1) the trust must fulfill three
requirements: (1) it is not exempt from taxation under section
501(a); (2) all of its unexpired interests are devoted to one or more
of the charitable purposes set out in section 170(c) (2) (B); 5 (3) a
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501 (c) (3) [hereinafter all references in
the text and footnotes to "sections" are references to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as amended, hereinafter also referred to as the Code]. This
section provides that the following organizations shall be exempt from
taxation:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organ-
ized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is . . .
attempting, to influence legislation . . . or intervene in . . . any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
Id.
3. For income tax purposes, this classification can be somewhat il-
lusory. If the income of a nonexempt trust is dedicated in perpetuity for
charitable purposes, the trust may not be technically exempt from income
tax under section 501(a); but section 642(c) (1) creates the effect of tax
exemption by providing for an unlimited charitable deduction for any
amounts paid for charitable purposes pursuant to the terms of the trust's
governing instrument.
There is a good deal of confusion surrounding the basic exempt-
nonexempt classification. The committee reports, S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969), solved only part of the problem:
Under present law, an organization is exempt if it meets the
requirements of the code, whether or not it has obtained an "ex-
emption certificate" from the Internal Revenue Service.
An organization organized after October 9, 1969 is not to be
treated as exempt under section 501 (c) (3) unless it has notified the
Internal Revenue Service that it is applying for recognition of its
exempt status. As under present law, the nature of the organiza-
tion itself-not the determination of the Service-will control in
determining whether the organization is exempt. However, unlike
present law, an organization is not to be exempt under section
501 (c) (3) if it fails to make its existence and claimed status known.
Id. at 54, 55.
Section 4947(a) (1) and (2) applies to trusts which are not exempt
from tax under section 501 (a). It is unclear from the committee reports
whether they would regard pre-Reform Act trusts, which were exempt but
had no exemption certificate, as "not exempt from taxation under section
501 (a)." Taking a strict construction of the committee statement, one must
apply the Reform Act requirements that, to be exempt, the exemption must
be claimed and a certificate acquired for both pre-and post Reform Act
trusts. But see Fleming, Charitable Trusts Under the Reform Act, TAXES
757 (Dec. 1970).
4. INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, § 4947.
5. INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, § 170(c) (2) (B).
deduction for charitable contribution was allowed when the trust
was created under section 170, 545(b) (2), 556(b) (2), 642(c), 2055,
2106 (a) (2) or 2522 or the corresponding provisions of prior law.6
Split-interest trusts, as defined in section 4947 (a) (2), share
two of the three elements of a charitable trust: they are not tax
exempt under section 501(a) and a charitable contribution de-
duction was allowed when the trust was created. Split-interest
trusts are distinguishable, however, because, as the name implies,
the unexpired interests are split between beneficiaries who qualify
under section 170(c) (2) (B) charitable purposes and beneficiaries
who do not. Split-interest trusts which create a charitable re-
mainder will only be considered charitable remainder trusts if
they are established as unitrusts or annuity trusts.8
B. Private Foundation Provisions Applied to Charitable
Trusts and Split-Interest Trusts
One of the most significant consequences of the distinction be-
tween charitable trusts and split-interest trusts is the relation
each bears to the Code provisions governing private foundations.
Through the interaction of section 4947 (a) (1) with section 509, the
Reform Act has included charitable trusts, as distinguished from
split-interest trusts, within the definition of a private foundation.9
If a charitable trust is exempt from taxation under section 501
(c) (3),'0 it is presumed to be a private foundation under section
508(b) 1 ' and is placed directly within the section 509 (a) definition
of private foundation,12 unless described in one of the exceptions.
18
As noted previously, if a charitable trust is not exempt from tax-
ation under section 501(c) (3), it falls within section 4947.14 How-
ever section 4947 (a) (1) provides that such nonexempt trusts "shall
be treated as an organization described in section 501(c) (3)" for
all purposes of the Code other than section 508(a) (b) and (c).' 5
6. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 4947(a) (1).
7. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4947(a) (2).
8. Unitrusts and annuity trusts are discussed in detail beginning
with the text accompanying note 72 infra.
9. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 509(a) (1), (2), (3) & (4) provides excep-
tions to the definition of private foundations which are discussed in sec-
tion II of this Article infra.
10. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501 Cc) (3) exempts from taxation "[A]ny
... fund . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals ......
11. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 508(b) provides that "[A]ny organiza-
tion . . . which is described in section 501 (c) (3) . . . shall be presumed to
be a private foundation."
12. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 509(a): "For purposes of this title, the
term 'private foundation' means a domestic or foreign organization de-
scribed in section 501(c) (3). . .
13. See note 5 supra.
14. See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra.
15. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 508(a), (b) & (c) provide notification
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Treating nonexempt charitable trusts as organizations described
in section 501 (c) (3) places them within the section 509 (a) defini-
tion of private foundation as an "organization described in section
501 (c) (3).,,1"
Split-interest charitable remainder trusts are treated quite
differently. Rather than considering these trusts as organizations
described in section 501(c) (3), hence subject to section 509 and all
private foundation provisions, section 4947 (a) (2) merely enumer-
ates a few specific private foundation restrictions which apply to
split-interest trusts. 17 As an important definitional distinction,
therefore, split-interest trusts are neither treated like section 501
(c) (3) organizations nor subject to all private foundation provi-
sions. They are subject, however, to the following specific pri-
vate foundation sections: section 507 (relating to termination of
private foundation status); section 508(c) (relating to governing
instrument requirements to the extent that the requirements of
that section are applicable to a split-interest trust); section 4941
(relating to taxes on self-dealing); section 4943 (relating to taxes
on excess business holdings); section 4944 (relating to investments
which jeopardize charitable purpose); and section 4945 (relating
to taxes on taxable expenditures).18
Considering the vast array of potential restrictions and limi-
requirements for new organizations, a presumption of private foundation
status for certain organizations, and certain mandatory exceptions. The ex-
ception from section 508(b) has the positive effect of removing the pre-
sumption of private foundation status. Thus, it is likely to be a strong con-
sideration in determining whether or not to apply for an exemption under
section 501 (c) (3). However, the exception from section 508 (c) may have an
unintended drawback. It may deny those organizations which have es-
tablished their public charity or satellite position (under section 509(a))
the exemption from the notification requirement and the presumption of
private foundation status. In light of the section 4947 (a) (1) exception from
508 (a), (b) and (c), the provisions are circular.
16. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 509(a).
17. Circuitous and confusing drafting is particularly apparent in the
split-interest trust (charitable remainder trust) provisions. In the case of a
unitrust and annuity trust, a split-interest trust and a charitable remainder
trust are the same. Charitable remainder unitrusts and annuity trusts are
exempt from tax under section 664 (c), raising a question as to whether
trusts qualifying under the section 664 (d) (1) or (2) definitions are beyond
the reach of section 4947. Section 664(c) exempts qualifying charitable re-
mainder trusts from "any tax imposed by this subtitle." Section 664 is
within subtitle A of Chapter 1, but section 4947 and the series of private
foundation taxes which it imposes on the split-interest trust are within
subtitle D of Chapter 42. Additionally, an exemption under section 664(c)
does not render the trust not "nonexempt" for purposes of section 4947 (a)
(2), since the first sentence of that section states that it excludes only
trusts which are not exempt from tax under section 501 (a).
18. IN. Rsv. CODE of 1954, § 4947 (a) (2).
tations imposed on the use of the private foundation, it is comforting
to note that section 4940 (the 4% excise tax on net investment in-
come) and section 4942 (the tax on failure to distribute income)
are never applied against a split-interest trust.19 The application
of private foundation provisions is further diminished if the split-
interest trust is properly drafted and administered. The provi-
sions of sections 4943 and 4944, made applicable to split-interest
trusts by section 4947 (a) (2), will not apply if the trust is drafted
in accordance with section 4947(b) (3) (A) or (b). 20 Similarly, the
tax on self-dealing imposed by section 4941 and the tax on taxable
expenditures imposed by section 4945 can be easily avoided by the
appointment of a disinterested corporate trustee. Thus a properly
drafted charitable remainder unitrust or annuity trust will be ex-
empt from tax on its income.
21
II. CHARITABLE TRUSTS TREATED AS PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
A. Legislative History of Section 4947
Although it is clear that charitable trusts are within the defi-
nition of a private foundation, it is not clear why. A detailed
study of the Reform Act hearings before the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee does not
reveal one instance of abuse, self-dealing or irregular behavior by
a charitable trust. The Treasury Department paraded expert after
expert before the committees, each equipped with persuasive sta-
tistical data demonstrating self-dealing, unfair competition against
taxable business and scores of other abuses perpetrated by private
foundations. However, no statistics, evidence or testimony was
offered to show that the same behavior was true of charitable
trusts.2 2 Thus, it is not surprising that not one representative of
the trust and banking field testified on behalf of charitable trusts.
19. Id.
20. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 4947(b) (3). It is likely that after the
termination of the last non-charitable interest, the split-interest trust which
pays its income to charity in perpetuity will become a charitable trust un-
der section 4947 (a) (1) and thus be carried into section 509.
21. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 664(c). The inconsistency of the final
legislation when compared with the hearings is demonstrated by the de-
velopment of the split-interest trust and the perpetual charitable trust.
The perpetual charitable trust was virtually overlooked by the Treasury
Department. Indeed the U.S. DEP'T. OF' THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL MEMO-
RANDUM OF TREASURY POSITION ON H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)
(submitted to the S. Finance Comm., Sept. 30, 1969), makes no mention of
the type of trust controlled by section 4947 (a) (1). However, the split-inter-
est trust was singled out for almost total private foundation coverage:
Such a trust would be exempt from tax and would be subject to the
private foundation rules other than the income distribution re-
quirement. A charitable remainder trust should, in general, be
subject to all of the substantive requirements governing private
foundations.
Id. at 32. The resulting legislation reached virtually the opposite result.
22. Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the House Ways & Means Comm.
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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Section 4947 is the key to the mystery; its legislative history
provides insight into how charitable trusts were grouped with pri-
vate foundations. When Representative Wright Patman intro-
duced the Reform Act before the House Ways and Means Commitee
on Tuesday, February 18, 1969, there was no mention of section
4947 or of treating charitable trusts as private foundations. 23 The
House Ways and Means Committee conducted lengthy and detailed
hearings on the proposed bill for thirty days. Private founda-
tions were examined from every possible perspective, including
the personal in-fighting which characterized the operation of many
foundation-owned businesses.2 4 No mention was made of chari-
table trusts until the 28th hearing day when the Treasury Depart-
ment introduced the Nixon proposals. Section 4947, in a form sim-
ilar to the present legislation, was introduced at this time with the
following explanation: "Nonexempt trusts empowered by their
governing instruments to pay or permanently set aside amounts
for certain charitable purposes would also be subject to these pro-
visions."25
No further discussion or explanation of section 4947 can be
found; in fact, there was not even any reference to section 4947
in the House Committee Reports released on August 2, 1969. How-
ever in the Supplemental Report of the Ways and Means Commit-
tee, released on August 4, 1969,the public was notified for the first
time that charitable trusts were to be subject to an excise tax and
to special taxes designed to curtail private foundations. 26
The Separate Views on HR 13270 delivered by Congressman
Sam M. Gibbons, a Ways and Means Committeeman, presents an
explanation of the circumstances surrounding the initial enact-
ment of section 4947:27
I am severely critical of the manner in which this bill
was considered. I believe the overemphasis upon secrecy
23. Id. at 13. The Honorable Mr. Patman introduced his bill in a
prophetic manner: "Mr. Chairman, my bill is by no means a vindictive
measure; indeed, by encouraging the foundations to return to the original
purpose for their existence-that is, philanthropy-they should emerge
stronger, not weaker." Id.
24. Id.
25. Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the House Ways & Means Comm.
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5053 (1969). The general explanation of the Nixon
proposals never mentioned nonexempt charitable trusts and thus gives no
indication why the administration chose to subject them to private founda-
tion provisions. Id. at 5319-57.
26. H.R. REP. No. 413, pt. 2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1969). The
split-interest trusts were not subjected to all the private foundation re-
strictions in the final House version.
27. H.R. REP. No. 413, pt. 1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 214 (1969).
was detrimental to a thorough consideration of this legis-
lation. In addition to secrecy, there was, in my opinion,
too much haste in the final deliberations to do justice to
this most important piece of legislation.
28
Congressman Gibbons further exposed the outrageous be-
havior of the Treasury Department in their haste to enact some
tax reform legislation: "[I]t was not until the 28th of July, 6
days before the writing of these views, that the committee had the
first opportunity to view any of the more than 360 pages of this
very complicated legislation."2 9
It is reasonable to conclude that section 4947 was enacted by
the House in a manner which did not give the fullest consideration
to potential ramifications.
Even though the section received only cursory treatment by the
House, it should have been examined by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee in their hearings on the House Bill.30 However, such was
not the case. The Senate Finance Committee hearings were also
lengthy and detailed. Foundations were again examined from
every conceivable viewpoint But no testimony was given against
or on behalf of charitable trusts. It appears that the trust institu-
tions were caught unaware. 1
The only authentic legislative history dealing with section 4947
is found in a brief statement of the Senate Committee Report con-
cluding that if charitable trusts were not included within the defi-
nition of a private foundation, then a private foundation could
elude the intended taxes and restrictions by becoming a charita-
ble trust.32 It is amazing that committee reports on section 4947
could have been prepared by the Finance Committee, which con-
ducted no hearings on charitable trusts. Since no evidence was
presented which in any way substantiates the report that taxpay-
ers could avoid the private foundation restrictions by use of non-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Fi-
nance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
31. The oversight was colossal. One of many examples is the opening
statement of McGeorge Bundy, President of The Ford Foundation:
The proposed tax reform bill (H.R. 13270) introduced a new term'private foundation', into the Internal Revenue Code. The new
definition will include hundreds of organizations which have never
been thought of as private foundations and which, on the basis of
their activities, should not be classified as private foundations.
Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 5410 (1969). Mr. Bundy enumerated many of these "hundreds"
of organizations but not one represents a charitable trust-he had no idea
of his understatement.
32. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 96, 97 (1969):
If a nonexempt charitable trust were not subject to many of the
requirements and restrictions imposed on private foundations, it
would be possible for taxpayers to avoid these restrictions by the
use of nonexempt trusts instead of private foundations.
Id. at 96.
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exempt charitable trusts, it is difficult to discern what the Finance
Committee was reporting. It appears that an axe was employed
where a scalpel would have been more appropriate.
B. Section 509-Private Foundation Defined and Limited
Considering the questionable legislative background of section
4947,33 which requires the inclusion of charitable trusts within the
definition of private foundations, it seems that some exception
should be available to permit charitable trusts to operate as they
have in the past.
A small charitable trust created by John Doe with his local
bank as trustee to pay all of its income in perpetuity to or for the
use of John's Alma Mater and or favorite hospital should not be
subject to an excise tax. Nor should the trust be subject to rigid
reporting requirements, income distribution requirements, or any
other restrictions which impair the total contributions available
to the named charity. Section 509 (a) (3) could provide such an
exemption.
34
Section 509 (a) (3) provides three distinct tests which must be
met to qualify for a satellite exemption. The exemption is al-
lowed if the organization:
(A) is organized, and at all times thereafter is operated,
exclusively for the benefit of, to perform the functions
of, or to carry out the purpose of one or more specified
organizations described in [section 509 (a) (1) and
(2)] . . 35
(B) is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in connec-
tion with one or more organizations, described in
[section 509 (a) (1) and (2) ] . . ., and36
(C) is not controlled directly or indirectly by one or more
disqualified persons (as defined in section 4946) other
than foundation managers and other than one or more
organizations described in [section 509 (a) (1) and
(2) ] .. 7
The first two tests provide a variety of methods for achieving satis-
factory qualification; only the third test provides no alternatives
to the charitable trust.
33. See text accompanying notes 22-32 supra.
34. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 509(a) (3).
35. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 509(a) (3) (A). The "specified organiza-
tions described in section 509 (a) (1) or (2)" will hereinafter be referred to a
"a public charity."
36. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 509 (a) (3) (B).
37. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 509(a) (3) (C).
C. The Plain Meaning of Section 509 vs. The Treasury
Department's Interpretation
A reasonable interpretation of section 509(a) (3) is that Con-
gress intended the optional tests of paragraphs (A) and (B) 38 to
permit a broad spectrum of organizations to qualify for the exemp-
tion from private foundation restrictions. Notwithstanding the
congressional intent which can be inferred from reading the stat-
ute, the Treasury Department has included a requirement of active
participation in each of the alternatives under requirement B
above. In order to fulfill the "active participation" requirement
the satellite organization.3 9 must be more directly involved in the
operation of the public charity than merely paying income to or
for the use of the chairty.40 Although there is no transcript of
hearings to cast light upon the intended use of this particular ex-
ception, the committee reports mention several examples of or-
ganizations which were intended to qualify under the section 509
38. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
39. An organization qualifying as section 509(a) (3) exception to pri-
vate foundation status is referred to in the Committee Reports as a satel-
lite organization.
40. The Treasury Department's position was stated by a Treasury
Department official, K. Martin Worthy, in an address before the Council
on Foundations Conference:
In considering what elements of operation, control and super-
vision by public charities are required for a trust to qualify for
exclusion from the definition of private foundation under the satel-
lite provisions, it has been argued that if the trust is an express
trust exclusively for named public charities as beneficiaries, the
fact that it is a trust for named beneficiaries, should satisfy both
the benefit and the control and supervisory requirements of 509
(a) (3).
In other words, the argument runs, if a charitable trust is es-
tablished under terms which vest the beneficial interest in the
property in a specific public charity, the legal standing of the pub-
lic charity as express beneficiary of the trust to institute actions to
restrain fiduciary abuses and compel compliance with terms of the
trust should be sufficient assurance of administration of the
trust properties in the public interest to satisfy the scheme of the
statute.
The weakness in such an approach, however, is that the legal
capability of a beneficiary to intercede in the internal adminis-
tration of the trust properties, other than in cases of outright dis-
honesty or violation of the terms of the trust, is usually circum-
scribed by the terms of the trust instrument and state law. If the
instrument confers broad investment discretion upon the trustees,
the beneficiary has, in fact, little, if any, legal standing before a
court to control investment practices.
The legislative history would appear significant in limiting its
examples of the application of Section 509(a) (3) to organizations
such as university presses, alumni associations and the Milton Her-
shey Trust, organizations which stand in an unusual, direct and
meaningful relationship to one or more public charities. The or-
ganizations referred to in the Committee Reports as examples of
Section 509 (a) (3) organizations seem in each case to be involved in
a more active relationship to the public charities than that norm-
ally descriptive of charitable trusts merely required to pay over
income to a named beneficiary.
Address by K. Martin Worthy, Council on Foundations Conference, May
27, 1970.
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(a) (3) satellite provisions. The only example in any of the commit-
tee reports purporting to apply to charitable trusts is the Hershey
Trust which is mentioned in both the House and Senate reports. 41
While the Hershey Trust plays an active and significant role in
the every day operation of the Milton Hershey School, it should
be pointed out that the Hershey Trust is only used as an example
of an organization which is "controlled in connection with" a
public charity. 42 Consequently, it has no weight when used by
the Treasury Department as authority to deny section 509(a) (3)
qualification to a charitable trust which is "operated in connec-
tion with" a public charity.
Even though some of the examples of qualifying satellite or-
ganizations listed in the Committee Reports are organizations
which are in active supporting roles, the examples are designated
"examples" and as such were not intended to be all inclusive. The
active participation required by the Treasury Department seems
entirely consistent with congressional intent when applied to an
organization "operated by," "supervised by" or "controlled by" its
parent public charity. This requirement is less understandable
when the satellite is "supervised or controlled in connection with"
the public charity; it seems completely misapplied if a charitable
trust is "operated in connection with" a public charity.
Another indication that Congress intended charitable trusts to
be eligible for exemption from private foundation status is found
in the exception contained in the last sentence of section 4947 (a)
(1).4 3 That exception gives pre-Reform Act charitable trusts and
charitable remainder trusts, after the termination of their non-
charitable interest, the opportunity to meet the section 509 (a) (3)
(A) test of being organized and operated exclusively for the benefit
41. H.R. REP. No. 413, pt. 1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1969).
In general, religious organization other than churches, the Hershey
Trust (which is organized and operated for a specific school for or-
phaned boys and is controlled in connection with that school), uni-
versity presses, and similar organizations are examples of organi-
zations expected to qualify for this category.
Id. See also S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1969).
42. H.R. REP. No. 413, pt. 1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1969): "[T]he
Hershey Trust . . . is organized and operated for a specific school for or-
phaned boys and is controlled in connection with that school. . . ." K.
Martin Worthy also relies on the Hershey Trust to advance his thesis.
Thus, he is speaking of charitable trusts which are "controlled or super-
vised by or in connection with a public charity." See note 40 supra.
The usual charitable trust is normally operated "in connection with" its
beneficiary public charity through an informal association of the trustee of
the trust and the managers of the charity.
43. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 4947 (a) (1).
of a public charity. If Congress did not contemplate the inclusion of
charitable trusts within the exception provisions of section 509
there would be no need for such a provision.
The inescapable conclusion is that charitable trusts were not
considered to be private foundations when the committee reports
were prepared. Section 509 (a) (3) was drafted in broad enough
terms to exclude charitable trusts from private foundation status.
Nevertheless the Treasury Department has unilaterally taken the
position that charitable trusts shall not be excluded unless they
actively participate in the functions of the public charity. While
this position is reasonable for organizations which are controlled
or supervised by, or in connection with, the public charity, it is
prohibitive for organizations operated in connection with the
public charity. The Treasury Department seems to have overlooked
the intent of Congress in providing for several types of relation-
ships which may qualify for satellite exemption under section
509(c) (3). The result is that the active function requirement has
the effect of eliminating a charitable trust which would seem to
qualify under an objective reading of the Code.
D. The Proposed Regulations
The proposed section 509 regulations reflect the Treasury De-
partment's position and are unusually detailed with regard to
the section 509 (a) (3) exception. The Treasury Department is
zealously attempting to keep this exception out of the reach of char-
itable trusts. Their position is established in the very first para-
graph of the proposed regulations: "Organization [sic] which fall
into the categories excluded from the definition of 'private foun-
dation' are generally those which either have broad public support
or actively function in a supporting relationship to such organi-
zations. '44  If these proposals are not changed, it is highly un-
likely that any charitable trust will comply with section 509 (a) (3)
without the aid of a judicial determination to that effect.
1. Section 509(a)(3)(A).
Looking first at section 509 (a) (3) (A), it should not be difficult
for a charitable trust to meet the structural and functional prongs
of its three tests. A charitable trust created to pay its income
annually to one or more public charities in perpetuity should logi-
cally meet the Code's requirement that it be organized and at all
times thereafter operated exclusively for the benefit of a public
charity.45 In an attempt to explain the law, the proposed regula-
44. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-i, 35 Fed. Reg. 17845 (1970).
45. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 509(a) (3) (A). A drafting point here
might be to insure that all such trusts are created to pay their income "to
or for the benefit of" the named charity.
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tions list four requirements with which the articles of incorpora-
tion (trust indenture) must comply to meet the organization
test:
46
1. Limit the purposes of the trust to one or more of the
purposes of the public charity.
2. Restrict the trust from engaging in activities which are
not in furtherance of the stated purposes of the pub-
lic charity.
3. State the specific public charity on whose behalf the
trust is operated (designation is only required where
the organization seeks to qualify under the "operated
in connection with" option, but can be lifted even in
this case where an historic relationship creating a sub-
stantial identity of interest can be shown) .17
4. Restrict the trust from supporting any organization
other than the specified public charities.
48
Although none of these requirements are unduly burden-
some, item 3 forecasts the Treasury Department's position in their
other section 509 (a) (3) tests. The Treasury Department is at-
tempting to withhold qualification from a charitable trust operated
in connection with a broad public charitable purpose which
does not specify an exact charity if the trust is either too newly
drafted to establish an historic relationship or too small to create
a substantial identity of interests. This is characteristic of the
Treasury Department's attempt to preclude the charitable trust
from the section 509 (a) (3) exception.
49
The proposed regulations permit compliance with the opera-
tional test of section 509(a) (3) (A) if the charitable trust engages
solely in activities which benefit or support the public charity 0
This should cause little difficulty for the normal charitable trust
having a corporate trustee.
2. Section 509(a)(3)(B)
The proposed regulations for section 509 (a) (3) (B) set out two
46. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(c) (1), 35 Fed Reg. 17852 (1970).
47. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(d)(ii), 35 Fed. Reg. 17853
(1970); § 1.509(a)-4(d) (4), 35 Fed. Reg. 17853 (1970). See also § 1.509(a)
-4(i) (4), 6, 35 Fed. Reg. 17856 (1970). Although there is no apparent leg-
islative warrant for requiring the organization "operated in connection
with" to designate the public charities for which it is intended to benefit, in
the majority of cases this requirement will be met by the charitable trust.
48. Propsed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(c)(1)(i)-(iv), 35 Fed Reg.
17852 (1970).
49. See note 40 supra.
50. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(e)(1), 35 Fed. Reg. 17853
(1970).
tests which must be met by any satellite organization seeking an
exemption from private foundation status under section 509(a)
(3): a responsiveness test and an integral part test.51 These tests
are in accordance with the Treasury Department's theory that ac-
tive participation is essential for a satellite organization to be ex-
cluded from the private foundation definition.
5 2
Requiring charitable trusts to be responsive to the needs of
the charities which they service is in accord with the basic con-
gressional intent of requiring organizations which receive chari-
table deductions to actually benefit their beneficiary charities. In
addition, it is likely that the integral part test is a necessary in-
gredient for some of the relationships created in section 509 (a) (3)
(B). The proposed regulations logically require a substantial de-
gree of direction over the programs, policies and activities of satel-
lites seeking qualification as exempt organizations under the re-
lationship of "operated, supervised or controlled by" a public chari-
ty.53  Similarly, to be "supervised or controlled in connection
with" a public charity, the satellite must be controlled or managed
by the same persons who control or manage the public charity and
merely making payments of income will be insufficient.5 4 It is
submitted, however, that the integral part test is inappropriate
to determine the "operated in connection with" relationship.
Section 1.509(a)-4(i) of the proposed regulations establishes the
ground rules for qualifying under the "operated in connection
with" relationship. Charitable trusts will easily comply with the
responsiveness test. After establishing a maze of interlocking di-
rectory rules and exceptions, the proposed regulations concede
that the satellite will be responsive to the needs and demands of
the public charity if it is a charitable trust under state law,55
names the public charity benefited in its trust,56 and empowers the
51. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(f)(3), 35 Ftd. Reg. 17854
(1970):
Although more than one type of relationship may exist in any
one case, any relationship described in section 509(a) (3) (B) must in-
sure that:
(i) The section 509 (a) (3) organization will be responsive to
the needs or demands of one or more section 509 (a) (1) or (2) or-
ganizations; and
(ii) The section 509(a) (3) organization will constitute an in-
tegral part of, or maintain a significant involvement in, the op-
erations of one or more section 509 (a) (1) or (2) organizations.
52. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
53. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(g)(1), 35 Fed. Reg. 17854
(1970).
54. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(h) (1), (2), 35 Fed. Reg. 17854
(1970).
55. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i) (2) (ii) (a), 35 Fed. Reg. 17855
(1970).
56. Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.509(a)-4(i) (1) & (ii), 35 Fed. Reg. 17855
(1970). Establishing an historic relationship would be a valid substitute
for this requirement in that it would totally eliminate the need for a re-
sponsiveness test. The test is indistinguishable from the operational test
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beneficiary to enforce the trust and compel an accounting under
state law.
57
The second requirement for active participation is the integral
part test.68 It is principally in this area that the Treasury De-
partment is guilty of overreaching. The integral part test created
by the proposed regulations requires that the trust maintain a sig-
nificant involvement in the operation of the public charity and
that the charity be dependent upon the trust for the type of sup-
port which it provides. 9  To meet these requirements: (a) the
activities engaged in for the charity must be of the type which the
charity itself would normally engage in but for the satellite;80 or (b)
the trust must make payments of substantially all of its income
to or for the use of the charity; and the amount of support received
by each beneficiary charity must be a sufficiently substantial
portion of its total support to insure the attentiveness of the
charity to the operations of the trust.6 1 The last sentence of
secion 1.509(a)-4(i)(3)(ii) dispells any doubts about the meaning
of the integral part test when applied to organizations "operated
in connection with" a public charity:
[W] here none of the beneficiary organizations is depen-
dent upon such organization for a substantial portion of
and its exception. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(c) (1) (iii), 35 Fed.
Reg. 17852 (1970); § 1.509(a)-4(d)(2)(ii) (a) & (b), 35 Fed. Reg. 17853
(1970). See also Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(c) (1) (i)-(iv), 35 Fed.
Reg. 17852 1970).
57. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i) (2) (ii) (a)-(c), 35 Fed. Reg.
17855 (1970). It is strange that the Treasury Regulations recognize the
controlling effect of local law on a charitable trust's activities in this lim-
ited instance, but do not take cognizance of it in qualifying a charitable
trust under section 509 (a) (3). The theory is the same: the power to en-
force the trust under local law gives the public charity the necessary au-
thority to practically eliminate the opportunity for abuse. In most states
the attorney general can enforce the interests of a charitable cestui que
trust. However, attorneys general rarely have the authority to protect
beneficiaries of private foundations. Unfortunately, Congress did not con-
sider this distinction. Obviously, however, the Treasury Department was
aware of the overseeing nature of local trust law. The treasury regula-
tions should better reflect the importance of local law in protecting the
trust from abuse.
58. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i) (3), 35 Fed. Reg. 17855 (1970).
59. Id.
60. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i) (3) (i), 35 Fed. Reg. 17855
(1970). It would seem that the payment of income to the charity would be
a function which the charity would normally engage in. The regulations ap-
pear to contemplate, however, that the satellite would totally relieve the
charity of the particular function. See ex. 5, reproduced in text accompany-
ing note 64 infra. Again, we see no legislative warrant for this distinction.
61. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i) (3) (ii), 35 Fed. Reg. 17855
(1970).
the beneficiary organization's support, the requirements
of this subparagraph will not be satisfied, even though
such beneficiary organizations have enforceable rights
against such organizations under state law.
62
Under this regulation a large charitable trust has a far better
opportunity of meeting the integral part test than a small chari-
table trust. This policy of discouraging charitable contributions
by individuals not having great wealth is questionable. With all
of the publicity heralding the Reform Act as the great equalizer, as
the one tax act which would benefit the poor and close the loop-
holes of the rich, it is surprising that the Treasury Department
has thwarted its own stated purpose. Even if it is true that chari-
table trusts must be treated as private foundations to restrict in-
dividuals from attaining tax benefits through charitable trusts
which they previously obtained through using private founda-
tions, the integral part test fails to close a gaping loophole. A
trust large enough to assure a public charity of all its needed
funds can escape taxation if the charity will voluntarily restrict
the funds it accepts from others.
It is more likely, however, that wealthy individuals will not
be able to use large charitable trusts for abusive purposes, since
further restrictions are contained in the third test for qualification
under section 509(a) (3) (C). The charitable trust may not be con-
trolled by one or more disqualified persons (as defined in section
4946) other than foundation managers or public charities. 3 This
restriction, along with the protection of local law, guarantees that
the large qualifying charitable trusts will not abuse their trust
status, since they are virtually required to appoint a disinterested
corporate trustee before obtaining the necessary qualifications under
section 509 (a) (3). If large trusts are unable to abuse their freedom
from private foundation restrictions, small trusts, having less finan-
cial leverage, will also lack the opportunity for abuse. Since the
purpose of the private foundation provisions was to eliminate tax
abuse, and charitable trusts were treated as private foundations in
order to prevent evasion of the private foundation provisions by
the use of charitable trusts, charitable trusts should not be subject
to the private foundation restrictions where they do not provide
a vehicle for tax abuse.
It is submitted that a change should be made in the Treasury
Department's proposed regulations reversing the result reached in
Example 5 of section 1.509(a)-4(i) (4). This example is so criti-
cal to the basic error in the Treasury Department's position that
it bears reprinting for purposes of discussion:
R is a charitable trust created under the will of B. Its
purpose is to hold assets as an endowment for S, a hospi-
62. Id.
63. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 509(a) (3) (C).
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tal, T, a university, and U, a national medical research
organization (all being described in section 509(a) (1)
and specifically named in the trust instrument), and to
distribute all of the income each year in equal shares
among the three named beneficiaries. S, T, and U have
certain enforceable rights against R under state law, in-
cluding the right to compel an accounting. Except for
making these annual payments, the trustees of R have no
further contacts or relationships with S, T, or U. The
payments by R to such organizations do not comprise a
substantial portion of the total support of any of these
organizations. Although R meets the responsiveness test
described in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, it does
not meet the integral part test described in subparagraph
(3) of this paragraph. R is not, therefore, considered as
operated in connection with one or more section 509(a)
(1) or (2) organizations within the meaning of section
509 (a) (3) (B). 64
The conclusion of Example 5 raises a question as to the con-
gressional intent behind the words "one or more" as used in sec-
tion 509(a) (3) (A) and (B). An organization will qualify as a
satellite if it is organized and operated for the benefit of one or
more specified organizations and operated in connection with one
or more organizations. Congress chose to allow the satellite to
benefit more than one public charity, yet the proposed regulations
practically eliminate this option. Only the very wealthiest trusts
will be large enough to supply a substantial portion of the support
of more than one public charity. Surely, Congress would not have
provided the option of benefiting more than one public charity if
they had intended to require substantial support, almost to the
point of dependency. It is submitted that by requiring charitable
trusts "operated in connection with" a public charity to fulfill the
integral part test the Treasury Department has placed a restric-
tion on charitable trusts which was never intended by Congress.
IV. LIVING WITH THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS
If no change is made in the proposed regulations, acceptable
operation of an existing charitable trust will require that the trust
terminate the "private foundation status" and become a public
charity.
65
64. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i) (4), ex. 5, 35 Fed. Reg. 17856
(1970).
65. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 507(b) (1) (B); an attempt may also be
made to meet "operating foundation" status under section 4942(j) of the
proposed regulations. The Treasury Department has again imposed an
active participation requirement here and much the same arguments which
Assuming that the trustee and attorney are unwilling to take a
position inconsistent with the proposed section 509 regulations, the
private foundation taxes and restrictions may be avoided by ter-
minating the private foundation status. If the trust has not been
guilty of willfully repeated acts of abuse which causes the imposi-
tion of one or more of the special private foundation taxes of
Chapter 42, private foundation status can be terminated. The
trust meets the section 509 (a) (3) definition"6  within twelve
months67 after notifying the Secretary or his delegate as long as
the last day in the twelve month period ends before ninety days af-
ter final regulations are issued under section 507 (b) (1) (B).68 As
long as the private foundation status is terminated in accordance
with the provisions of section 507(b) no termination tax will be
levied under section 507(c). That tax is only levied on private
foundations which are terminated under the provisions of section
507(a).69
It appears that private foundation status can be terminated
in accordance with section 507(b) by appointing, having a local
court appoint,70 or having a local court grant authority to the
beneficiary charity to appoint additional trustees from members
of the governing body of the public charity. The proposed regula-
tions are satisfied if a majority of the trustees of the charitable
trust are appointed or elected by the public charity or its members
or officers. The trust will then be deemed to be within the "op-
erated, supervised or controlled by" relationship of section 509 (a)
(3) (B).71.
obtain for lifting this requirement from section 509 (a) (3) also apply to re-
moving it from section 4942 (j). Operating foundation status provides only
partial freedom from private foundation restrictions. Hence, it is not felt
to be worth the effort in the majority of cases where the same factual cir-
cumstances could produce complete exemption under section 509 (a) (3).
66. The section 509(a) (1) or (a) (2) definitions may also be met to
terminate, but it is questionable whether an existing irrevocable trust
could be so amended. However, many trustees are presently requesting
local courts to use their cy pres power to meet similar Reform Act re-
quirements.
67. There is also a 60 month termination period. It will be ignored
for present purposes because the twelve month period is still open.
68. Section 507(b) (1) (B) of the Act provides that the allowable 12
month reformation period was to have begun with the trust's first taxable
year which begins after December 31, 1969. Section 13.12(j) (1) of the tem-
porary regulations, however, extended the termination time for the 12
months to 90 days after final regulations are issued. See Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 13.12(j) (1), 35 Fed. Reg. 15916 (1970). Hence, the Treasury Depart-
ment is willing to allow more liberalized termination rules by, in effect,
measuring the 12 month period backwards.
69. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 507(c).
70. Whether new appointments will be made by local courts can not
be determined at this point. Hopefully, cy pres will be used by a court that
foresees the likely frustration of charitable purpose through imposition of
the excise tax and other foundation taxes and restrictions.
71. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(g) (1), 35 Fed. Reg. 17854 (1970
This is an interesting result since this test would appear to be much more
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III. CHARITABLE REMAINDER TRUSTS
7 2
The legislative history preceding the changes made by the
Reform Act is much different for charitable remainder trusts than
it was for charitable trusts. Whereas the Reform Act made sweep-
ing changes in the operation of charitable trusts without consider-
ing them at the hearings, 8 the changes made in the operation of
charitable remainder trusts were thoroughly aired and hotly con-
tested. Charitable remainder trusts were defended by many char-
itable organizations.7 4 The first concern of these organizations
was that the changes made by the Reform Act would "discourage
or eliminate these gifts.17 5 A related criticism was that:
The proposed provisions to limit charitable remain-
der trusts to the "annuity" or "unitrust" type would com-
plicate our ability to explain such trusts to potential
donors and also these types of trusts would be difficult
to administer, and thus would place a serious burden on
our college administrative staff.
7 6
Not all of the testimony relating to charitable remainder trusts
was favorable, however, and the proposed changes ultimately re-
ceived committee approval. The greatest impetus for change came
from the belief that charitable remainder trusts were a vehicle for
tax abuse. The Official Summary of the Senate version of the
Tax Reform Bill notes that:
[P]resent rules allow a taxpayer to receive a charitable
difficult to meet. Yet the Treasury Department Regulations impose no in-
tegral part test on the "operated, supervised or controlled by" relationship
which requires substantially all of the charity's income to be furnished
by the trust.
72. The term "charitable remainder trust" is used throughout this
section to catalogue those trusts which make annual payments to at least
one non-charitable beneficiary and direct remainder interest to an organ-
ization described in section 170(c).
These trusts were introduced and defined as "split-interest trusts" in
section I of this article supra. The application of private foundation pro-
visions to these split-interest/charitable remainder trusts is discussed in
notes 17-21 and the accompanying text supra.
73. See section II A of this article, Legislative History of Section 4947,
supra.
74. The concern of charitable organizations is understandable. Ac-
cording to Robert E. Burns, President, Association of Independent Cal-
ifornia Colleges and Universities, many nonprofit educational institutions
rely on charitable remainder trusts for 25 to 50% of their annual contribu-
tions. Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., 2505 (1969).
75. Id.
76. Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 2528 (1969) (testimony of Homer Grant, President, North-
rop Institute of Technology).
contribution deduction for a gift to charity of a remainder
interest in trust which is substantially in excess of the
amount the charity may ultimately receive.
7
Moreover, the Senate Report states that the annunity trust and
unitrust rules were enacted
[t] o provide a closer correlation between the charitable
contributions deduction and the ultimate benefit to char-
ity.'
8
The statements for and against the proposed changes reflect
the commonly held belief that prior to the Reform Act charitable
77. JOINT HOUSE AND SENATE COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
OFFICIAL SUMMARY OF SENATE FINANCE COMM. VERSION OF H.R. 13270, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 32 (1969).
78. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 87 (1969). Harold Lloyd,
President and Chairman of the Board of the Shriners Hospitals for Crip-
pled Children commented on this and other unclear statements in the
SENATE REPORT, Hearings on H.R. 13270 Befo-re the Senate Finance Comm.,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969):
Looking at the Committee's first sentence, it is obviously true that
the amount of the charitable remainder deduction will have little,
if any, close causal relation to the value of the benefit which the
charity actually receives. It shouldn't! In many cases, it could
very likely be many years (after one or more intervening life
estates) before the charity or educational institution will actually
receive its interest, and if recent history can offer any guide, it is
that the value of assets eventually passing to charity will have con-
siderably appreciated in value from the date of computation of the
charitable remainder. It is rather difficult to comprehend the
Committee's particular reasoning in placing so much emphasis on
trying to make a close comparison between the value which a char-
ity ultimately receives and the dollar value of the actual charita-
ble deduction taken in the estate, unless the Committee or the
Treasury [Department] wishes to set the normal investment poli-
cies and standards for the trustee.
What the Committee appears to lose sight of in its comments is
that when this charitable remainder becomes vested, the amount of
the charitable remainder interest deduction is determined by ref-
erence to the government's life-remainder annuity tables as set
forth in the Federal Estate Tax Regulations. This can be likened,
I suppose, to a person who prepares a Will, not knowing what
conditions may be present at the time of his death. He prepares
his Will on the basis he may die tomorrow. Certainly, if a dif-
ferent annuity factor would now be more appropriate in valuing
the charitable remainder, this could be easily accomplished without
establishing completely new tax concepts which are not in accord
with accepted fiduciary standards of conduct. Under the new tax
proposal, every Will or living revocable trust involving a charitable
remainder interest would have to be revised or the taxpayer
would suffer a complete loss of his charitable tax deduction.
As a reason for making this proposed change, the Committee indi-
cates that ". . . trust corpus can be invested in high-income, high-
risk assets," . . . thus asserting that the non-charitable income in-
terest would benefit to the detriment of the charity's remainder
interest. It would be most unusual, we believe, to find a high-risk
speculative equity investment (purchased for capital appreciation),
also paying a high income. The opposite is usually the case. In
most all instances, the receipt of a higher income by the income
beneficiary results from a very conservative investment policy pur-
sued by the trustee. Under this form of investment policy, there
is little likelihood of any charitable remainder being enhanced in
value. It would thus seem that the government would have less
concern if the trustees did in fact follow the investment policies
of which it now expresses anxiety.
Id. at 2555-56 (emphasis added).
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remainder trusts enjoyed favored status in tax law. The case law
prior to the Reform Act indicates, however, that any tax advan-
tage the charitable remainder trust did provide was shrouded with
uncertainty. There were many disallowed deductions. 9
A. Pre-Reform Act Charitable Remainder Trusts
Prior to the Reform Act, it was quite simple to create a chari-
table remainder trust. All the grantor needed to do was trans-
fer property to a trust, reserve an income interest for a nonchari-
table beneficiary, and direct the remainder interest to a charity.
There was ample incentive to create such a trust. In addition to
the benefit bestowed on charity, the charitable remainder trust
offered substantial benefits to the donor. The most significant ad-
vantage was the generation of a current charitable deduction from
the donor's income tax for the value of the remainder interest
Additional benefits could be derived where the trust res was com-
posed of highly appreciated, low yield stock. First, no gain on
the appreciation would be recognized in the inter vivos transfer
of this stock to the charitable remainder trust. Second, the
trustee could then sell this stock and invest in either tax-exempt
or high yield securities, also without the recognition of gain. 0
Thus, the donor retained the income from his property, increased
its yield without paying any tax on past appreciation, and re-
ceived a current charitable deduction. Indeed, these benefits
were "widely used and understood;" s ' the vehicles for achieving
them, however, were not.
In order to receive a charitable deduction under prior law the
charitable remainder trust had to fulfill two criteria. First, the
value of the charitable remainder interest had to be ascertainable
at the time the gift was made.8 2 Second, this ascertained charitable
79. See cases collected at P-H FED. TAxEs 120,555.
80. Unless there is an express or implied agreement that the appre-
ciated property will be sold and the proceeds invested in tax-exempt
securities, in which case Rev. Rul. 60-370, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 203, pro-
vides that the transaction is in substance a sale of securities by the donor
and a gift of the cash proceeds to the charity. See Taggart, The Charitable
Deduction, 26 TAX. L. Rsv., 98-101 for a discussion of the effect of the Tax
Reform Act on this Ruling.
81. Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 2622 (1969) (testimony of Eldridge R. Plowden on behalf
of Chapman College, Orange, California).
82. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(a) (1954):
[For Estate Tax purposes] . . .if a trust is created or property is
transferred for both a charitable and a private purpose, deduction
may be taken of the value of the charitable beneficial interest only
insofar as that interest is presently ascertainable, and hence sev-
interest had to be secure from erosion or invasion by the trustee.
If the charitable interest could be divested by the occurrence of any
event or the exercise of any power, the charitable deduction was
disallowed unless the possibility of divestiture was so remote as
to be negligible8s3 Thus, the value of a charitable remainder de-
termined prior to the effective dates of the Reform Act 4 was
based on two probabilities: (1) the probable life expectancy of the
non-charitable beneficiary; and, (2) the probable occurrence of a
contingency or power of invasion which could divest the chari-
table interest.
8 5
As might be expected in such a subjective area, there was fre-
quent disagreement between taxpayers and the Internal Reve-
nue Service8 6 as to what these probablities were in any given
case.
erable from the noncharitable interest.
Id.; Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(a)-2(a) (1954) provides a rule for gift tax pur-
poses that is parallel to the one stated above. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2 (d) (2)
(1969) provides that "[for income tax purposes] the present value of the
remainder interest in the property, taking into account the value of the
life estates reserved to the taxpayer and his wife, may be allowed as a
charitable deduction."
Although these rules seem to be applying the same principles, it has
been indicated that the income and estate tax rules differed with respect to
contingent remainders. See H.R. REP. No. 413, pt. 1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
59 (1969); S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 88 (1969). See also Laurit-
zen, Charitable Bequests and Powers of Invasion, TAX COUNSELOR'S QUARTER-
LY 10 (March 1970) (discussion of rule envisioned by Congress). Hereafter,
no differences will be noted between income, estate, and gift tax rules re-
lating to charitable remainders, and only the estate tax rules will be cited.
Note that section 201(d) of the Reform Act makes the unitrust and annuity
trusts rules of section 664 applicable to estate and gift taxes, and thus
creates the desired uniformity.
83. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (1954).
84. For gift and income tax purposes, the unitrust and annuity trust
rules apply to transfers in trust made after July 31, 1969. See Tax Reform
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 573, §§ 201(g) (4) (D), (g) (5)
'(1969). However, practioners have been given until July 1, 1971, to amend
or start court proceedings to amend any trust created after July 31, 1969
which fails to qualify as a charitable remainder trust. See U.S. DEP'T. OF
THE TREASURY, Information Release No. 1060 (Dec. 18, 1970).
Generally, for estate tax purposes, the unitrust and annuity trust rules
are effective for all persons dying after December 31, 1969. Tax Reform Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 573, § 201(g) (4) (A) (1969). In the case
of property passing under a will executed on or before October 9, 1969, or
involving property transferred in trust on or before October 9, 1969, the
unitrust and annuity trust rules do not apply: (1) if the decedent dies be-
fore October 9, 1972, without republishing the will or amending the trust
instrument after October 9, 1969; or, (2) if the decedent was prevented from
amending the dispositive provisions of the will or trust instrument after
October 9, 1969, either because these provisions are irrevocable or the de-
cedent is under a mental disability which prevents an amendment. id.
§ 201(g) (4) (B), (C).
85. These two probabilities are what Harold Lloyd had in mind
when he criticized the Joint House and Senate Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation for seeking a direct relation between the charitable de-
duction and the benefit ultimately conferred on charity. See note 78, supra.
86. Hereinafter referred to as "the Service."
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The following example illustrates some of the problems
which frequently arose. Assume that a grantor creates an irre-
vocable inter vivos trust, reserving the income to himself for life
and giving the remainder to charity. Assume further that the
grantor nominates a corporate fiduciary, that the grantor's attor-
ney drafts a trust agreement which embodies time-honored in-
vestment powers, and that no evil motives can be ascribed to the
grantor. What assurance could the grantor's attorney give him
that he will be allowed a charitable deduction for the value of the
remainder interest passing to charity?
If the trust instrument permitted the trustee to invade prin-
cipal for the beneficiary's comfort, support and maintenance, the
charitable deduction would be denied.8 T If the trustee possessed
a power of invasion for medical expenses8 or emergencies, the de-
duction would be denied.89 If the grantor of a charitable remain-
der trust gave the trustee any power to invade principal, he ran
a serious risk that this power would render the value of the re-
mainder interest unascertainable. 90
Another problem faced by charitable remainder trusts prior
to the Reform Act concerned the investment powers of the trus-
tee. The Service has taken the position that the power to invest in
certain assets is tantamount to a power of invasion, which ren-
ders the value of the remainder interest unascertainable.9 1 The
cases and rulings have focused mainly on two types of assets:
mutual funds and wasting assets.
Revenue Ruling 60-3859- sets out the Service's position on mu-
tual funds. When the trust instrument empowers the trustee to
invest in mutual funds, the value of the remainder interest is
deemed ascertainable only if the trust agreement provides that
capital gains dividends shall be allocated to principle. 93 The
87. See, e.g., Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335
U.S. 595 (1945); Merchants Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Commissioner, 320 U.S.
256 (1943); Sachter v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The test for determining whether the value of the remainder interest is
ascertainable is whether the language of the governing instrument pro-
vides an objective standard by which one may predict the extent to which
the principal of the trust may be invaded. This test also turns on prob-
ability.
88. Estate of Wilcox, 1957 P-H. TAX CT. REP. & Mavi. DEC. 57,091.
89. Estate of Thompson, 1958 P-H TAx. CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 1 58,100;
CUM. BULL. Rev. Rul. 70-450, 1970 INT. REV. BULL. No. 35, at 10.
90. See note 7 supra.
91. Estate of Stewart v. Commissioner, 1971 P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM.
DEC. 147,525 (3d Cir. 1971).
92. Rev. Rul. 385, 1960-2 CUM. BULL 77.
93. Id.
value of the remainder interest is not ascertainable, however, if the
trustee has the discretion to allocate capital gain dividends to in-
come, or the trust instrument requires or could be construed under
local law to require such an allocation.94 Revenue Ruling 67-3395
expands the Service's position by denying a charitable deduction
for the gift of a remainder interest even when the trust instru-
ment does not expressly authorize the investment in mutual fund
shares. If local law would authorize such an investment and
would permit the allocation of capital gains dividends to income
the deduction is denied. 96
The unreasonableness of this position arises because the chari-
table deduction is fully denied, even though the unascertained
portion of the remainder interest relates only to an increment on
principal and in no way resembles a power of invasion. This dis-
tinction was recognized by the court in Miami Beach First National
Bank v. United States,97 which rejected the theory of Revenue
Rulings 60-385 and 67-33.
[T] he defendant would have the Court equate the power to
to invade corpus with the power to allocate capital gains
distribution. The two are not analogous ... . When
there is a power of invasion of the corpus, with the ex-
tent of the invasion undeterminable, it becomes impossible
to set a certain minimum amount that the charity will re-
ceive. The power to allocate capital gains income pre-
sents a very different situation. Capital gains are tra-
ditionally considered an increment to principal rather
than an increment to income, but it cannot be disputed
that capital gains are an increment. For the purposes of
the estate tax charitable deduction, once the bare minimum
distribution to charity is assured, it does not matter where
the increment goes. 98
Another criticism of the Service's treatment of mutual fund
investments is that it disregards the duty of a fiduciary to consider
equally the interests of the beneficiary and the remainderman and
the duty of the state attorney general to insure that the charitable
remainder interest is protected. 9
The power of the trustee to invest in wasting assets without
the requirement of a depletion reserve has been another fertile
area of litigation.10 0 The cases in this area involve essentially the
94. Id.
95. Rev. Rul. 33, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 62.
96. Id.
97. 25 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 70-1502, 1505 (Fla. 1969), appeal docketed,
No. , 5th Cir. (Jan. 21, 1971).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax. R.
2d 70-1531 (N.J. 1969). In that case, the court rejected the theory of Rev.
Rul. 385, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 77. It stated: "No court in New Jersey would
permit the trustee to so use its power to deplete the trust corpus in order
to benefit the life beneficiary." Id. at 1533.
100. See, e.g., Estate of Stewart v. Commissioners, 1971 P-H TAx CT.
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same issue as the mutual fund cases: can investment powers
amount to an indirect power of invasion rendering the value of
the remainder interest unascertainable. The predominance of
early taxpayer victories in this area generated a good deal of op-
timism among practitioners, and caused many of them to overlook
the startling amount of litigation. Now that the Service has won
its first major victory in Estate of Stewart v. Commissioner,101 the
prospects for future litigation are alarming.
Prior to the Reform Act, therefore, everything was not so sim-
ple and well understood. Although the charitable remainder trust
was relatively simple to create and held great benefits for the
taxpayer, it was subject to attack and defeat on many grounds.
The sea may have looked calm, but those who ventured out knew
better. The Service has been, and still is, relentlessly sniping at
charitable remainder trusts. Perhaps the most distressing aspect
of this attack, moreover, is that it has confused rather than clarified
the issues.
B. Charitable Remainder Trusts Under the Tax Reform Act
The cases and rulings discussed above will be current law to
the trial lawyer for at least another decade. And, in light of these
decisions, the estate or tax planner will surely want to review his
"time-honored" investment clauses. Beyond these considerations,
however, this earlier discussion is largely historical. The change
in the tax law relating to charitable remainder trusts is so drastic
that virtually no trust created before 1970 can qualify as a chari-
table remainder trust under the new law.
The creation of a charitable remainder trust is not as simple
as it once was. There are now only three keys to the charitable
remainder treasure chest. No charitable deducton will be al-
lowed for a charitable remainder interest in trust unless the trust
is an "annuity trust,"'1 2 a "unitrust,"'0 3 or a "pooled income
fund." 0 4  The rule applies uniformly for income, 05 estate, 0 6
REP. & MEM. DEC. 147,525 (3d Cir. 1971); Bankers Trust Co. v. United
States, 1971 P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 144,447.
101. 1971 P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEm. DEC. 147,525 (3d Cir. 1971). Note
also that the Service has nonacquiesced in Estate of McGillicuddy, 54 T.C.
315; and that it has appealed the decision in the Miami Beach First Nat'l
Bank case. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
102. INT. RE. CODE of 1954, § 664(d) (1).
103. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 664(d) (2).
104. INT. REV. CODEOf 1954, § 642(c) (5).
105. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(f) (2) (A).
106. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2055(e) (2) (A).
and gift'0 7 tax purposes.
In addition to the detailed statutory provisions which must be
complied with to establish a qualifying charitable remainder trust,
the practitioner must also master the proposed regulations issued
by the Treasury Department under section 664.108
These regulations are a maze of stricture and complexity, re-
plete with enough mandatory requirements to assure that there
will never be a "constructive unitrust."'10 9 Although this com-
plexity has aroused much objection to the new law, it is hoped that
the formalistic approach taken by the proposed regulations will
create certainty in the area of charitable remainders. Simplicity
after all is no virtue if it does not produce clarity.
The following discussion 110 focuses on the three primary vehi-
cles for creating a charitable remainder interest. The annuity trust
and the pooled income fund are discussed briefly and some ap-
parent disadvantages are noted. The unitrust is discussed in greater
depth because it is a workable concept that is compatible with
the desires of most grantors.
1. Annuity Trust
Generally, an annuity trust is a trust which pays a sum cer-
tain to at least one noncharitable beneficiary for a term of years
or for life, and following these annuity payments the remainder
interest in the trust is transferred to charity. 1 ' One potential ad-
107. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2522(c) (2).
108. Proposed Treas. Regs., 35 Fed. Reg. 12467-77 (1970).
109. One commentator, Fleming, Charitable Trusts Under the Tax Re-
form Act, TAxEs 762 (Dec. 1970), notes that:
There are no less than seven "boiler-plate" requirements under
the proposed Regulations for governing instruments creating chari-
table trusts, five of which are the same for both annuity trusts and
unitrusts, one of which relates to the subject of future additions but
calls for different wording, and one of which relates only to uni-
trusts prescribing a valuation date where the unitrust has a short
taxable year. Several of the seven seem to go beyond mere inter-
pretation of the statute. Scarcely any of the seven would occur to
a drafter to include in a will or trust agreement but for the Regula-
tions.
110. Throughout this discussion, a charitable remainder annuity trust
will be referred to as simply an "annuity trust" and a charitable remainder
unitrust will be referred to as a "unitrust." It is recognized, however,
that these trust forms were not created by the Reform Act and that they
can exist without a charitable remainder. For a discussion of unitrusts
generally see Comment, Unitrust in Estate Planning-a Partial Panacea,
21 VAND. L. Rsv. 1023 (1968).
111. INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 664(d) (1):
CHARITABLE REmAINDER ANNUITY TRusT-for purposes of this sec-
tion, a charitable remainder annuity trust is a trust-
(A) from which a sum certain (which is not less than 5 per-
cent of the initial net fair market value of all property placed in
trust) is to be paid, not less often than annually, to one or more
persons (at least one of which is not an organization described in
§ 170(c) and, in the case of individuals, only to an individual who
is living at the time of the creation of the trust) for a term of
years (not in excess of 20 years) or for the life or lives of such
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vantage of the annuity trust is that the payment of a sum cer-
tain guarantees the beneficiary a fixed number of dollars re-
gardless of the earnings or value of the trust assets. In a severe
decline, this rule places the beneficiary's interest ahead of the
charitable interest. In addition, a contribution to an annuity trust
will yield a higher charitable deduction than the same contribu-
tion to a comparable unitrust. For example, if a male grantor,
age sixty, transfers $100,000 to an annunity trust, reserving $5,000
per year for his life, the value of the remainder interest (i.e. the
charitable deduction) will be approximately $54,000.112 On the
other hand, if the same grantor transferred $100,000 to a unitrust,
reserving annual payments equalling five percent of the unitrust
assets for his life, the value of the remainder interest would be
approximately $48,000.113
The annuity trust has three major disadvantages however,
individual or individuals,
(B) from which no amount other than the payments de-
scribed in subparagraph (A) may be paid to or for the use of any
person other than an organization described in § 170 (c), and
(C) following the termination of the payments described in
subparagraph (A), the remainder interest in the trust is to be
transferred to, or for the use of, an organization described in
§ 170(c) or is to be retained by the trust for such a use.
Id. (note that section 664 (d) (1) (B) above prohibits invasion of the annuity
trust assets).
112. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-(c), 35 Fed. Reg. 12470 (1970) pro-
vides that the fair market value of the remainder interest in an annuity trust
is the net fair market value of the property placed in trust less the present
value of the annuity. The present value of the annuity is determined by
section 20.2031-10 of the regulations, which is effective for all annuity
trusts regardless of when created. For all other valuation purposes, the
section 20.2031-10 tables are effective for persons dying after December 31,
1970. U.S. DEP'T. oF TREASURY, Internal Revenue Decision No. 7077, 1970
INT. REV. Buii. No. 52, at 22:
1. Present value of the annuity equals the factor for a male, age 60
taken from Table (A) 1 of Reg. 20.2031-10 (9.1753) times amount of
the reserved annuity ($5,000) or 45.8765.
2. The value of the remainder interest equals: the net fair market
value of the property placed in trust ($100,000) less the present
value of the annuity (45,876) or $54,124.
113. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-4, 35 Fed. Reg. 12471 (1970) provides
that the fair market value of a remainder interest in a unitrust is deter-
mined by multiplying the net fair market value of the property placed in
trust times the factor determined under either § 1.664-4(b) (3) (term of
years) or § 1.664-4(b) (4) (life of one individual). This example ignores an
adjustment for payout sequences as provided in Table F of the Proposed
Treas. Regs., 35 Fed. Reg. 12477 (1970), which is discussed at the text accom-
panying note 157 infra. Thus, in the example set forth in the text, the
value of the remainder interest in the unitrust is determined as follows:
Net fair market value of property placed in trust ($100,000)
times the factor determined under Table E (1) for a 5% payout for
a male age 60. (.48833 - ignoring payout sequence adjustment)
equals $48,833.
which erode these apparent economic advantages: First, although
the grantor receives a larger charitable deduction for the gift to an
annuity trust, he is giving more to charity. With an annuity trust,
the beneficiary can never receive more than the stated sum per
year. However, with a unitrust, the reserved payout will increase
if the value of the unitrust's assets increases. Second, additional
contributions cannot be made to an existing annuity trust.
114 This
prevents a grantor from creating an inter vivos annuity trust and
making either testamentary transfers or additional inter vivos
transfers to the same trust. Thus, a certain informality is lost in
the trust's creation and each transfer requires additional legal
documentation and safeguards. Third, the payment of a sum
certain offers no hedge against likely inflation. Although the
annuity trust offers a theoretical advantage in case of serious de-
flation, the economic trend for the past forty years has been in-
flationary. There is every indication that the inflationary spiral
will continue. For these reasons the use of the annuity trust is
limited and it is not discussed further in this article. However,
many of the practical considerations discussed in connection with
the unitrust are also applicable to the annuity trust.
2. Pooled Income Fund
A pooled income fund is a fund formed by a public charity to
which persons irrevocably transfer property, reserving the income
for life to themselves or other beneficiaries. 15 Thus, as in a chari-
table remainder trust, there is a reserved income interest and a
charitable remainder interest.11 6 All property transferred to the
fund is commingled. 1 7 The amount of income payable to the named
beneficiaries is dependent on the earnings of the fund."l8 Like the
annuity trust, the pooled income fund has disadvantages when
compared with the unitrust. For example, section 642 (c) (5) (C)
provides that a pooled income fund may not have investments in
tax-exempt securities; 19 there is no such restriction on the invest-
ments of a unitrust. Thus, the beneficiary of a pooled income fund
cannot receive passed through tax-exempt income. Moreover,
section 642(c) (5) (A) provides that the donor to a pooled income
fund can reserve only an income interest.120 The use of the word
"income" invokes the traditional distinctions of local law relating to
corpus and income. Since tax-exempt income is prohibited and
since capital gains will normally be allocated to the remainder in-
114. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-2(b), 35 Fed. Reg. 12470 (1970).
115. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 642(c) (5) (A).
116. See Sanders, How to Draft Charitable Remainder Trusts in View
of New Proposed Regs. J. TAXATION (Nov. 1970).
117. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 642(c) (5) (B).
118. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 642 (c) (5) (F).
119. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 642(c) (5) (C).
120. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 642(c) (5) (A).
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terest, rather than the "income" interest, all of the distributions
to the beneficiary will be taxed as ordinary income. As discussed




A unitrust is a trust which meets the following requirements:
(1) the trust shall pay annually an amount equal to at least
5% of the net fair market value of the trust assets, valued at least
annually;
122
(2) to one or more persons, at least one of whom is not an or-
ganization described in section 170 (c); and in the case of individuals,
only to an individual who is living at the creation of the trust;
12z
(3) for a term of years, not to exceed 20 years, or for the life
of one or more living individuals, and;
124
(4) following the termination of the payments to the non-chari-
table beneficiary, the remainder interest in the trust is to be trans-
ferred to, or for the use of, an organization described in section
170(c), or is to be retained by the trust for the use of an organiza-
tion described in section 170(c).1
25
The term "unitrust" is descriptive. Its purpose is to unite the
interests of the beneficiary and the remainderman. Since the re-
quired payout to the beneficiary is based on a fixed percentage of
unitrust assets, both the beneficiary and the remainderman are
interested in growth assets. For this reason, the unitrust should
be treated by the trustee as a single fund, without distinction be-
tween principal and income. 126 If the trustee invests in assets
which pay no interest or dividends, but which demonstrate steady
growth, the interests of both the beneficiary and the remainderman
are served.
121. See text beginning with note 167 infra.
122. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 664(d) (2) (A).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. INT. Riw. CODE of 1954, § 664(d) (2) (C). An organization described
in section 170(c) is a charitable organization.
126. In fact, the unitrust instrument should contain a statement to this
effect to alert the trustee, and perhaps a court of equity, that this is a crea-
ture of federal tax law and not a traditional trust. Except for limited re-
liance on local law, its rules are tax rules. Traditional divisions of income
and principal are sure to arise in local courts, however, since even the pro-
posed regulations make reference to "corpus and income." See Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(d) (2), 35 Fed. Reg. 12468 (1970).
The following discussion embodies suggestions and considera-
tions relating to the creation and operation of a charitable remainder
unitrust. Throughout, the practitioner should remember three
things: (1) a unitrust is truly different from a traditional trust
and many traditional trust notions simply do not apply; (2) gener-
alizations are made for convenience only-the tax planner should
analyze each set of facts and "work out the numbers;" and, (3) a
unitrust is irrevocable.
1 27
C. Creation of a Unitrust
1. Selection of the Required Payment
The governing instrument of a unitrust must provide for the
payment of at least five percent of the net fair market value of
trust assets to the beneficiary "not less often than annually.'
1 28
A threshold question, therefore, is what percentage of the trust
assets should be selected by the grantor for distribution. The
needs of the beneficiary and the amount of benefit the grantor de-
sires to bestow on the charity bear heavily on this decision. In
addition, the grantor's charitable deduction will decrease as the
fixed percentage increases. The analysis should not stop here,
however. Beyond these considerations, the grantor should com-
pare the charitable deduction which is derived from each possible
payout with the spendable income that the beneficiary will re-
ceive. For example, if a grantor transfers $100,000 to a unitrust,
reserving a five percent payout for himself for life, he will re-
ceive roughly $5,000 per year from the unitrust (ignoring any in-
127. During these uncertain times, the draftsman of a unitrust might
want to insert protective language such as the following in his unitrust
agreement:
This Unitrust is intended to qualify as a Charitable Remainder
Unitrust as defined by § 664(d) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. The Grantor directs that all questions pertaining to this
Unitrust be resolved according to this express intention. Moreover,
the Trustee shall not exercise any power or discretion granted
under this Agreement or otherwise in such a manner as to dis-
qualify this Unitrust as an exempt trust within the meaning of
§ 664(c).
This Unitrust was created prior to the promulgation of Final
Regulations under § 664. Therefore, should final Regulations under
§ 664, or any other pertinent rulings, regulations, laws, or de-
cisions conflict with this Agreement, it is intended that such
rulings, regulations, laws, or decisions shall control; but only to the
extent necessary to have this trust qualify or continue to qual-
ify as a Charitable Remainder Unitrust.
The effect of a provision such as the above is strengthened by the de-
cision in Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax
R. 1608 (S.D. Fla. 1970), where the court held, inter alia, that the following
provision is effective to preserve a charitable deduction:
Any power granted to my fiduciaries shall be void to the extent
that its exercise would cause my estate to lose all or any part of
the tax benefit afforded by the marital deduction or charitable
deduction under Federal or State laws.
Id. at 1610.
128. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 664(d) (2) (A); Proposed Treas. Reg. §
1.664-3 (a) (1) (i), 35 Fed. Reg. 12470 (1970).
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crease in the value of the unitrust assets.) If the grantor is a male,
age sixty, his charitable deduction will be about $48,000 (ignoring
various possible payout sequences) .129 If the same unitrust required
a six percent payout, the grantor's deduction would be reduced to
about $43,000. However, the grantor would be receiving $6,000
each year. Thus, depending on the grantor's life expectancy and
income tax bracket, the higher fixed percentage may provide
more after-tax dollars for the grantor even though reducing the
charitable deducton.
1" 0
Section 664(d) (3) (A) provides an exception to the fixed per-
centage distribution of unitrust assets. The governing instru-
ment may provide a payment option which, if adopted, requires
the trustee to distribute the fixed percentage payout or the amount
of trust income determined under section 643 (b),131 whichever
is less.'3 2 The advantage of this provision is that in a year when
trust income is less than the required percentage payout, the trus-
tee is able to simply distribute the income available. If this op-
tion were not included, the trustee would have to sell unitrust prop-
erty or distribute it in kind to the beneficiary to make up the de-
ficiency. In a year when trust income exceeds the required pay-
out, the trustee may distribute this excess trust income to make up
deficiencies in earlier years when trust income was less than the
required payout. 13' The following example illustrates how this
provision operates.
129. See note 113 supra for the calculation of this figure.
130. If the beneficiary is someone other than the grantor, the analysis
should still be applied.
131. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 643 (b):
For purposes of this subpart and subparts B, C, and D, the term
"income," when not preceded by the words "taxable," "distribu-
table net," or "gross," means the amount of income of the estate or
trust for the taxable year determined under the terms of the gov-
erning instrument and applicable local law. Items of gross income
constituting extraordinary dividends or taxable stock dividends
which the fiduciary, acting in good faith, determines to be allocable
to corpus under the terms of the governing instrument and applica-
ble local law shall not be considered income.
Id.
132. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 664(d) (3) (A). Note the use of the words
"may" and "shall" in this section. The governing instrument "may pro-
vide," but once it does, the trustee "shall pay." Note also that the op-
tional provision cannot be used with an annuity trust.
133. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 664(d) (3) (B).
Trust Required § 664(d)(3)(B) Trustee Shall
Income Payout 1 4  Deficiency Distribute
Year 1 3000 4500 (1500) 3000
Year 2 4000 5000 (2500) 4000
Year 3 6000 4500 (1000) 6000
Year 4 7500 5000 None 6000
Year 5 7000 5000 None 5000
There are numerous disadvantages to this payout option, how-
ever. Initially, trust income is determined under section 643
(b) . 135 This section resurrects the traditional division of princi-
pal and income and the traditional problems of balancing the in-
terests of the beneficiary and the remainderman. These are the
very problems the unitrust was designed to solve. Moreover, while
the beneficiary loses the security of the fixed percentage to the
extent that the actual income of the trust may fall below the
fixed percentage, the grantor receives no increase in chari-
table deduction. Another disadvantage is that the payments re-
ceived by the beneficiary will generally be treated as ordinary in-
come. 138  Under the optional payout provision, distributions are
keyed to trust income rather than to a fixed percentage of unitrust
assets. Since trust income is determined under section 643(b),137
and since this generally means ordinary income, as opposed to
capital gains, the distributions to the beneficiary will be taxed as
ordinary income.
138
2. Selection of a Taxable Year
The selection of the taxable year for a normal trust is sus-
ceptible to sophisticated tax planning. The same is true for a
unitrust. Since few normal trust instruments guide the trustee
134. Determined by applying the fixed percentage times the net fair
market value of unitrust assets.
135. See note 131 supra.
136. The section 643 (b) definition of trust income will not normally
include capital gains. Therefore, unless the grantor transfers tax-exempt
securities to the unitrust or the trustee acquires these securities the distribu-
tions to the beneficiary will be ordinary income. If large amounts of capital
gain were generated on the sale of unitrust assets, and the proceeds were
used to purchase tax-exempt securities, it is unclear whether this capital
gain would affect the tax-free character of the distributions to the bene-
ficiary. In the absence of the optional payout provisions, section 664(b)
requires that capital gains generated on the sale of unitrust property must
be exhausted before the beneficiary can receive tax-free income. This
seems to be the result that Congress was aiming at in the tier system of
section 664(b). And it is hard to believe that the beneficiary could re-
ceive tax-free income before capital gains by electing the optional payout
provision.
137. See note 131 supra.
138. On the other hand, when distributions are keyed to the fixed per-
centage of unitrust assets, there can be a distribution to the beneficiary
even though there is no trust income within the meaning of section 643 (b).
In such a case, the distribution might be considered capital gain or a return
of principal, depending on whether the unitrust generated any capital
gains during the current year or in prior years.
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in the selection of a taxable year, often the trustee simply selects
a calendar year for bookkeeping ease. The regulations under
section 441,19 however, generally permit a new taxpayer to adopt
any taxable year when he files his first return.140 The proposed
regulations under section 664 do not make any reference to sec-
tion 441, but there is no reason to doubt that normal trust rules
will apply to the unitrust. Thus, the regulations give the tax plan-
ner a valuable right-one that he should not overlook.
The selection of a taxable year is important. The proposed
regulations provide that the beneficiary shall include all amounts
received from the unitrust in his gross income for the taxable
year which includes the last day of the trust's taxable year.141 For
example, assume the beneficiary is on a calendar year and the uni-
trust has a taxable year ending on January 31, 1971. The unitrust
agreement requires an annual distribution to be made within sixty
days after the end of the taxable year of the unitrust. Thus, a dis-
tribution made to the beneficiary on February 15, 1971, will be in-
cluded in his gross income for 1971. On the other hand, if the tax-
able year of the trust ended on December 31, 1970, the same dis-
tribution made on February 15, 1971, would be included in
the beneficiary's gross income for 1970.142 The difference between
these two examples is the difference between including the
same payment in the beneficiary's gross income on April 15, 1971
139. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 441 governs the "Period for Computa-
tion of Taxable Income."
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.441-1(b) (3) (1954).
A new taxpayer in his frist return may adopt any taxable year
which meets the requirements of section 441 and this section with-
out obtaining prior approval. The first taxable year of a new tax-
payer must be adopted on or before the time prescribed by law
(not including extensions) for the filing of the return for such tax-
able year ...
141. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(d) (4), 35 Fed. Reg. 12469 (1970).
This is a normal trust rule, which is also set forth in INrT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 652(c):
If the taxable year of a beneficiary is different from that of the
trust, the amount which the beneficiary is required to include in
gross income in accordance with the provisions of this section
shall be based upon the amount of income of the trust for any
taxable year or years of the trust ending within or with his tax-
able year.
The apparent reason for this rule is that the character of trust distributions
is not known until the end of the trust taxable year.
142. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3 (a) (1), 35 Fed. Reg. 12470-71 (1970)
provides that payments made with 2 months after the close of the tax-
able year will be considered made on the last day of the taxable year of the
unitrust. Presumably, this means payments that are related to the prior
taxable year and does not encompass every payment within 22 months af-
ter the close of the unitrust's taxable year.
or April 15, 1972.143
A more dramatic illustration of this income deferral is the
following example. Assume the unitrust has a taxable year which
begins February 1, 1970 and ends January 31, 1971, and the
beneficiary is on the calendar year. The unitrust agreement
requires quarterly distributions as of April 30, 1970, July 31,
1970, October 31, 1970, and January 31, 1971. The distributions
made in 1970 are included in the beneficiary's gross income for
1971,'4 because January 31, 1971 is the end of the taxable year of
the unitrust ending within the taxable year of the beneficiary.
This result is reached even though the beneficiary is on the cash
basis and actually receives some cash in 1970. Since the character
of the distribution cannot be determined until the end of the uni-
trust's taxable year, the beneficiary cannot recognize and report
his income until this date.
145
Another aspect of selecting a taxable year is the "short" year,
or taxable year which is less than twelve months. Short years
can arise only in the first taxable year, if selected by the
grantor or the trustee, or in the last year if the beneficiary dies or
the unitrust otherwise terminates on a date other than the usual
143. One problem with the use of a taxable year ending on a date other
than December 31 is that when the beneficiary dies there will probably be
a double inclusion of income in the year of death. For example, assume
that a unitrust has a taxable year ending January 31, 1971, and the bene-
ficiary dies on December 1, 1971. Since the taxable year of the unitrust will
end on the date of death of the beneficiary, two taxable years of the uni-
trust (January 31, 1971 and December 1, 1971) will end within or with the
taxable year of the beneficiary. Consequently, in the beneficiary's final
income tax return, his executor will have to include in gross income the
distributions relating to both January 31, 1971 and those relating to De-
cember 1, 1971.
144. Inclusion in gross income in 1971, of course, means inclusion in a
return filed before April 15, 1972. This potential two year deferral of
income is softened somewhat by estimated tax payments, but the deferral
is still worth considering. Consider also the effect of quarterly payments
on the amount of the grantor's charitable deduction. See Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.664 (Table F), 35 Fed. Reg. 12477 (1970).
145. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(d) (4), 35 Fed. Reg. 12469 (1970),
provides, however, that if the beneficiary receives an additional payment
because of an incorrect valuation, the amount of the incorrect payment is
included in the beneficiary's gross income in the year when it is paid; it
does not relate to the year when it should have been paid. The proposed
regulations note that if the beneficiary must repay an amount to the uni-
trust because of an incorrect valuation, the beneficiary should "see section
1341 and the regulations thereunder...." Since the application of section
1341 is mandatory, the proposed regulations intend a positive direction.
An adjustment under section 1341 is made in the year of repayment rather
than in the earlier year when the beneficiary received too much, although
the adjustment does consider the effect of the increased income in the
earlier year. Section 1341 is outside the bar of the statute of limitations.
But, one problem with section 1341 is that no adjustment is made unless
the amount of repayment in the later year exceeds $3,000. Thus, if the
earlier year is barred by the statute of limitations, the beneficiary making a
repayment of less than $3,000 is barred from amending the earlier year by
the statute of limitations and cannot use section 1341 to transcend that bar.
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end of the taxable year. 146 The use of a short year permits the
spreading of income between two taxable years of the beneficiary.
However, the proposed regulations limit this advantage by requir-
ing a provision in the unitrust agreement which proportionately
reduces the amount distributed to a beneficiary in a short year.
For example, if the short taxable year was for a period of exactly
six months, the required payment would be one-half of the pay-
ment required for a twelve month taxable year.
147
Since there is the possibility of timing income to the benefi-
ciary, it is suggested that the grantor offer some direction to the
trustee concerning the taxable year of the unitrust. With an
inter vivos unitrust, the unitrust instrument could state when the
taxable year shall begin and end. The trustee, of course, would be
bound by the terms of the instrument. 148 In a testamentary uni-
146. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(c), 35 Fed. Reg. 12468 (1970) per-
mits the grantor to provide in the unitrust agreement that the payments to
any beneficiary shall terminate with the regular payment next preceding the
termination of the payments to the beneficiary, (i.e. death or expiration of a
term of years). This provision is useful in that it eliminates any computa-
tion when the payments terminate to any beneficiary. Moreover, if the
termination of payments arises because of the death of a beneficiary, this
provision prevents the likely inclusion of income in respect of a decedent
in the estate of the beneficiary. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 691.
147. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-(c), 35 Fed. Reg. 12467 (1970). An
example of an appropriate clause would be:
In the case of a taxable year which is for a period of less than
twelve months, the amount which must be distributed to the bene-
ficiary for this short taxable year shall be an amount equal to
(fixed percentage e.g. 6 percent) of the net fair market value of the
unitrust assets multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is
the number of days in the short taxable year and the denominator
of which is 365 (or 366 if February 29th is a day included in
the numerator).
In a short taxable year, the unitrust assets would be valued at the normal
valuation dates. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(e) (ii), 35 Fed. Reg. 12468
(1970) provides, however, that if no valuation date occurs before the end
of the short taxable year, the unitrust assets shall be valued on the last day
of the taxable year of the unitrust.
148. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1 (a) (3), 35 Fed. Reg. 12468 (1970)
provides:
In order for a trust to be exempt under § 664(c), it must meet the
definition of and function exclusively as a charitable remainder
trust from the creation of the trust. Solely for the purposes of this
section and §§ 1.664-2, 1.664-3, and 1.664-4, a charitable remainder
trust will be deemed to be created at the earliest time that the
grantor or any other person is not treated as the owner of such
trust, or any portion thereof, under subpart E of part 1 of sub-
chapter J of chapter 1 or title A of the Code or would not be so
treated except for the fact that the grantor or his spouse is named
a recipient, but in no event prior to the time property is first
transferred to the trust. ...
Id. (emphasis added). This section does not state that the first taxable
year of a unitrust begins when property is first transferred to the unitrust,
trust the grantor could select the taxable year of the unitrust in his
will. However, because of the uncertainty of death, perhaps the
selection of the taxable year of a testamentary unitrust should
be within the discretion of the testamentary trustee.
149
3. Valuation of Unitrust Assets
Section 664(d) (2) (A) requires that the unitrust be valued
annually. 150 The proposed regulations, however, permit the valua-
tion to be determined either on any one date during the taxable
year of the unitrust"'l or by taking the average of valuations made
on more than one date during the taxable year, as long as the
same dates and valuation methods are used each year.152 More-
over, the unitrust agreement must provide for adjustments in the
amount distributed in case the fair market value of unitrust as-
sets is incorrectly determined.' 5 3  Thus, the proposed regulations
add some flexibility to the annual valuation requirement by per-
mitting a periodic sampling of the value of unitrust assets and
also by indicating that any reasanable valuation method is per-
mitted as long as it is applied on a consistent basis.
Amid this reasonableness, however, are some mice that can
unnecessarily eat into the grantor's charitable deduction.5 4  The
selection of valuation and payout sequences, 15 5 for example, can
but it creates enough confusion that the cautious tax planner should avoid
the problem by making the first taxable year of a unitrust begin when
property is first transferred to the unitrust.
149. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
150. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 664(d) (2) (A).
151. Selection of the valuation date will affect the distribution to the
beneficiary. Since a unitrust is a single fund, without distinction between
principal and income, a valuation date at the end of a taxable year will
include increments to the fund during the year and will therefore be
higher than a valuation at the beginning of the taxable year.
152. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3 (a), 35 Fed. Reg. 12470 (1970). It
also provides that all accrued assets and liabilities are to be taken into
account when valuing unitrust assets. Presumably, the Treasury Depart-
ment intended to put the unitrust on the accrual method of accounting
for purposes of valuation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1 (a) and Treas. Reg.
§ 1.461- (a) (2). Generally, the accrual method will accelerate both income
and deductions. Since a unitrust is asset oriented, and should have no
long term liabilities, this rule would tend to increase the value of unitrust
assets. Correspondingly, the distributions to the beneficiary will be some-
what higher than if cash method principals were applied.
153. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(a), 35 Fed. Reg. 12470 (1970).
154. The use of "mice" here is intended to denote nibbling. There are
other vermin in the proposed regulations that can eat the grantor's entire
charitable deduction.
155. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-4(a) (1), 35 Fed. Reg. 12471 (1970)
provides that if the unitrust agreement does not prescribe when distribution
shall be made during the taxable year of the unitrust, for valuation pur-
poses, distribution is considered payable on the first day of the taxable
year of the trust. When combined with a valuation date on the first day
of the taxable year of the trust, this presumption considered in light of
Table F of the proposed regulations, could reduce the grantor's charitable
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have a significant effect on the valuation of the remainder interest.
Table F of the proposed regulations158 provides for a reduction of
the fixed percentage for purposes of valuing the remainder in-
terest depending on the frequency of payouts and the number
of months by which the valuation date precedes the first payout.1'57
For example, if the unitrust agreement provides for a February
1st valuation date and one annual distribution to be made on Feb-
ruary 15, no reduction in the fixed percentage is made. On
the other hand, if there are quarterly or monthly payments, the
fixed percentage would be reduced.5 8
Another aspect of valuing unitrust assets concerns additional
contributions, which, as noted earlier, 5 9 can be made to an existing
unitrust but cannot be made to an annuity trust. If the grantor
intends to make contributions to an existing unitrust, he must in-
clude a provision in the unitrust instrument adjusting the amount
to be distributed to the beneficiary for any taxable year that an
additional contribution is made. 60 This provision must contain
deduction. Therefore, distribution dates should be set forth in the unitrust
agreement after consideration of Table F.
156. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664 (Table F), 35 Fed. Reg. 12477 (1970).
157. Table F does not provide a factor when there is more than one
valuation date during the taxable year of the unitrust. Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.664-4(b) (2), 35 Fed. Reg. 12472 (1970) provides that when a uni-
trust has a payout sequence not covered by Table F, or when a unitrust has
more than one valuation date during its taxable year, a request for a spe-
cial factor must be made to the Commissioner. See Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 1.664-4(a) (3), 35 Fed. Reg. 12471 (1970). The request must be accom-
panied by a statement containing all the relevant information including
copies of the relevant instruments. The Commissioner, however, may de-
cline to furnish the special factor; if he does, the taxpayer must furnish
his own factor in accordance with the principles set forth in the proposed
regulations. Requests for special factors should be discouraged, however,
for two reasons. First, the Commissioner can refuse to furnish the factor,
usually after ample delay. Second, the Commissioner has disallowed more
than a few charitable deductions when merely asked to furnish a special
factor.
158. When valuing the remainder interest, any reduction of the fixed
percentage will increase the value of the remainder. See text accompanying
notes 128-129 supra.
159. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
160. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3 (b), 35 Fed. Reg. 12471 (1970):
In the case of additional contributions to the trust, the governing
instrument shall provide that for purposes of taxable year of the
trust in which the additional contribution is made that:
1. In the case where there is no valuation date (after the time
of the contribution), the additional property shall be valued at the
time of contribution, and
2. The amount described in paragraph (a) (1) (i) shall be com-
puted by multiplying the fixed percentage by the sum of (a) the
net fair market value of the trust's assets (excluding the additional
property as of the valuation date including any earned income
two requirements. First, if within the taxable year when the addi-
tional contribution is made, there is no valuation date after the
time of the contribution, the additional contribution is to be valued
at the time of the contribution.1 61 Second, the annual distribu-
tion to the beneficiary is determined by multiplying the fixed
percentage times the sum of:
(a) the net fair market value of unitrust assets on the valua-
tion date less the value of the additional contribution and any
appreciation of or increments on this additional property; 1 2 and
(b) an amount equal to the value of the additional property
(plus any increments) multiplied by a fraction the numerator of
which is the number of days (including the day of transfer) re-
maining in the taxable year when the additional contribution is
made and the denominator of which is the total number of days
in the taxable year of the unitrust.
163
For example, a calendar year unitrust requiring a five per-
cent payout has a single valuation date on December 31 each year.
At the end of its taxable year, December 31, 1971, the value of uni-
trust assets is $212,000. On April 1, 1971, however, an additional
contribution of $100,000 was made to the unitrust. Between April
1, 1971, and December 31, 1971, appreciation of and increments on
this additional property amounted to $12,000. How much should
be distributed to the beneficiary? Section 1.664-3 (b) of the proposed
regulations could support several results'6 4 but the most sensible
approach is a simple apportionment like the following:
The amount distributed equals: five percent times the sum
of (a) and (b).
(a) the net fair market value of unitrust assets on the valua-
tion date ($212,000) less the additional property and any incre-
ments thereto ($112,000), or $100,000; and
from and any appreciation on such property) and (b) that propor-
tion of the value of the additional property (that was excluded
under subdivision (a) of this subparagraph) which the number of
days (including the day of transfer) remaining in the taxable year




162. Id. Thus, when valuing unitrust assets, the additional property
will include not only the amount of the additional contribution but also
any increments to this property. It has ben suggested that this require-
ment be read as excluding the additional property but including the incre-
ments. However, one should assume that if the Treasury Department had
intended a "but" it would have used one and the first parenthetical in
section 1.664-3 (b) (2) of the proposed regulations should be read as exclud-
ing both the additional property and any earned income from or apprecia-
tion on such property.
163. Id.
164. See note 162 supTa.
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(b) the additional property and any increments thereto ($112,
000) multiplied by a fraction the numerator of which is the number
of days remaining in the taxable year when the additional con-
tribution was made including the day of transfer (274), the denomi-
nator of which is the total number of days in the taxable year (365).
Therefore, the amount distributed to the beneficiary equals: 5%274
times ($100,000 + E x $112,000) or 5% times $184,000; or $9,200.
Using the same example, assume that the additional property
was valued at $100,000 on the date of contribution, but depreciated
to only $50,000 as of the valuation date and had no increments.
The use of the words "as of the valuation date" in section 1.664-
3(b)(2) of thi- proposed regulations'6 5 would appear to require
that the additional property be valued as of the normal valuation
date of all of the unitrust assets, i.e., December 31. Using this
approach, the result is as follows:
5% times (a) $100,000 ($150,000 less $50,000) plus
(b) $37,500 (- x $50,000) or
5% times $137,500 or $6,875.
If, however, the valuation date is January 1 rather than De-
cember 31, compare the results in the above examples. In the
first example (appreciation of additional property) the result
would appear to be the same. But in the second example (de-
preciation of additional property) the result might be different.
Since there is no valuation date after the time of contribution,
the additional property is valued at the time of contribution
($100,000). Moreover, if "as of the valuation date" means the
valuation date of the additional property, rather than the valua-
tion date of the unitrust assets, the result is as follows:
5% times a) $50,000 ($150,000 less $100,000), plus
b) $75,000 (274/365 x $100,000) or
5% times $125,000 or $6,250.
It is submitted that this latter result is incorrect and that "as of
the valuation date" should mean the date when the unitrust assets
are valued and not the date when the additional property is valued.
Only the additional property should be apportioned and it should
be apportioned at its value on the date when the other unitrust
assets are valued. If the value of the unitrust assets on the valua-
tion date is $100,000, the beneficiary should get 5% of this amount
or $5,000. If the value of the additional property is $50,000 on the
valuation date, the beneficiary should get (in the example above)
165. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(b) (2), 35 Fed Reg. 12471 (1970).
5% of $50,000 ($2500) apportioned over the period that this addi-
tional property was part of the unitrust assets (274/365 or $1,875.
Thus, in the above example the beneficiary should receive $6,875
rather than $6,250.160
4. Beneficiaries and Remaindermen
Permissible beneficiaries include any named person or per-
sons,' 67 at least one of which is not an organization described in
section 170(c). 168 If the beneficiary is an individual, the benefici-
ary must be living at the time of the creation of the trust.'69 The
payments to the beneficiary can be made for a term of years,
not to exceed twenty years, or for the life or lives of any individ-
ual or individuals. 170  Thus, there can be successive benefi-
166. If we assume that this same unitrust provides for quarterly valua-
tions and quarterly payments rather than one annual valuation and pay-
ment, it is suggested that the same adjustment be made as provided by
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(b), 35 Fed. Reg. 12471 (1970) but that the
apportionment be made within a quarter. The proposed regulations imply
that an annual adjustment be made because they suggest that the entire
fixed percentage be applied against the apportioned amount of unitrust
assets. This section of the proposed regulations, however, does not really
deal with quarterly valuations or with quarterly payments. In either case,
the amount distributed to the beneficiary would be the same. By making
the adjustment within a quarter, however, the beneficiary gets the bene-
fit of the additional contribution sooner than he would if the adjustment
were made annually. To accomplish an adjustment within a quarter, the
governing instrument should contain a provision like the following (assum-
ing a five percent payout):
With respect to any additional contribution made between two
valuation dates, the amount to be paid to any beneficiary for the
payment date following the date of the additional contribution
shall be equal to an amount computed by multiplying one and one-
quarter (11Y4) percent times the sum of: (a) the net fair market
value of the unitrust's assets (excluding the additional property as
of the valuation date as well as any earned income from and any
appreciation on such property); plus (b) that proportion of the
value of the additional property (that was excluded under (a)
above) which the number of days (including the day of transfer)
remaining in the valuation period when the additional contribu-
tion was made bears to the total number of days in that valuation
period.
167. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (1) defines "person" as including
an individual, trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corpora-
tion.
168. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 664(d) (a) (A) and Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 1.664-3(a) (3), 35 Fed. Reg. 12470 (1970). The reason for this rule is that
if all of the beneficiaries were charitable, the trust would be a charitable
trust as defined by section 4947 (a) (1) rather than a split-interest trust (i.e.
unitrust) defined by section 4947 (a) (2). See Section II of this article supra.
169. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 664(d) (2) (A) and Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 1.664-3(a) (3), 35 Fed. Reg. 12471 (1970). One commentator, Lauritzen,
Charitable Bequests and Powers of Invasion, THE TAX COUNSELOR'S QUAR-
nmRLY, pt. 2, at 12 (March 1970), raises the question of whether "living at the
time of the creation of the trust" includes children "en ventre sa mere."
Id.
170. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 664(d) (2) (A).
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ciaries.171 However, the value of the remainder interest is sub-
stantially reduced by the inclusion of successive beneficiaries. De-
pending on the ages of the beneficiaries, it may be more advan-
tageous from a tax viewpoint to create a separate unitrust for
each beneficiary. The answer to this problem can only be re-
solved by computing the charitable deduction for each possibility.
Some grantors will want their unitrust structured a certain way
regardless of the tax implications. In addition, a gift tax will be
due for the value of the interest passing to each successive bene-
ficiary.
17 2
Upon the termination of the required payments to the bene-
ficiary, the remainder interest is to be transferred to or for the
use of an organization described in section 170(c); or the re-
mainder interest may be retained by the unitrust for the use of a
charity.
173
Two questions arise with respect to the remainder interest:
First, can the remainder interest be divided among more than one
charity? This question arises because section 664(d) (2) (C) states
that the remainder interest must be transferred to "an" organiza-
tion described in section 170 (c). The proposed regulations, how-
ever, provide that
[W]here interests in such corpus are given to more than
one organization described in § 170(c) such interests
may be enjoyed by them either concurrently or succes-
sively.
174
Thus, the Treasury Department seems to assume that Congress in-
171. An example would be A for his life, then to B if she shall survive
A, and then to C if she shall survive A and B.
172. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2503(b) and Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3
(1954), however, provide that the annual $3,000 gift tax exclusion is not
applicable to gifts of a future interest, including reversions, remainders,
whether vested or contingent.
173. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 664(d) (2) (C). Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 1.664-3 (a) (6), 35 Fed. Reg. 12471 (1970):
The governing instrument shall provide that, in the event that an
organization to or for the use of which the trust corpus is to be
transferred or for the use of which the trust corpus is to be re-
tained is not an organization described in section 170(c) at the
time when any amount is to be irrevocably transferred to such
organization, such amount shall be transferred to or for the use of
an organization or organizations which are described in section
170 (c) or retained for such use.
If the assets are retained by the unitrust for the use of a charity, the uni-
trust (a split-interest trust) becomes a charitable trust; pursuant to section
4947(a) (1) it would be treated as a section 501 (c) (3) organization. See
Section II of this article supra.
174. Compare the willingness to permit multiple charitable remainder-
men for the unitrust with the attempt to limit charitable trusts to one
beneficiary. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
tended the word "an" to be read as illustrative of the type of orga-
nization that can qualify to receive the remainder interest rather
than as a limitation on the number of qualifying organizations.
This result is desirable from an administrative view. It per-
mits the sprinkling of the remainder interest among more than
one charity. Also it is not inconsistent with the congressional in-
tent of correlating the charitable deduction allowed to the grantor
with the benefit received by the charity.
175
The second question is whether the charities receiving the re-
mainder interest must be identified at the time the unitrust -is
created, or can the selection of the charitable remainder be made
by the trustee or the beneficiary? The remainder should not have
to be indentified when the trust is created for two reasons. First,
the proposed regulations specifically require the beneficiary to be
named at the time the unitrust is created 176 but do not specifi-
cally require the remaindermen to be named at this time.1 7 There-
fore, it would appear that the Treasury Department is concerned
only that the remaindermen are described in section 170(c) and
not that they are named when the unitrust is created.' 78  Second,
the spirit of the legislation is directed at correlating the charitable
deduction allowed to the grantor with the actual benefit received
by the charity. This correlation will exist regardless of which
charity is the eventual remaindermen, as long as the remainder is
irrevocably transferred to an organization described in section
170(c). Thus, there should be no objection if the grantor does
not want to name the charity when he creates the unitrust, as
long as the range of possible remaindermen is limited to organi-
zations described in section 170(c). The grantor should be
able to give the trustee the discretion to name the charitable re-
mainder on the termination of the beneficiary's interest; or, to give
the beneficiary a limited power of appointment to name a chari-
table remainder.
D. Income Tax Considerations and the Operation of a Unitrust
A unitrust is exempt from all income taxes, except the tax
on unrelated business taxable income.1 79 But, the taxation of the
distributions to the beneficiary is flavored by the amounts of ordi-
nary income, capital gains, and tax-exempt income generated by
the unitrust.8 0  Section 1.664-1 (d) of the proposed regulations de-
175. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(a) (6), 35 Fed. Reg. 12471 (1970).
176. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3 (a) (3), 35 Fed. Reg. 12471 (1970).
177. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(a) (6), 35 Fed. Reg. 12471 (1970).
178. See note 172 supra. See also Estate of J. Wasserman, 1942 P-H
TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 42,108 (1942) which allowed a charitable deduc-
tion for a gift in trust, income to be paid to charities selected by the trustees.
179. INT. REv. ConE of 1954, § 664(c).
180. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 664(b):
Amounts distributed by a charitable remainder annuity trust
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scribes this flavoring process, and provides that the distributions to
the beneficiary shall be treated as having the following character-
istics:
First, as ordinary income to the extent of the sum of the uni-
trust's current ordinary income, and its undistributed ordinary in-
come from prior years;
Second, as short-term capital gain to the extent of the sum of
the unitrust's net short-term capital gain for the current year and
undistributed net short-term capital gains for prior years;
Third, as long-term capital gain to the extent of the sum of
the unitrust's net long-term capital gain for the taxable year and
its undistributed net long-term capital gains for prior years;
Fourth, as other income (e.g. tax exempt) to the extent of
the sum of the unitrust's other income for the taxable year and
its undistributed other income for prior years;
Fifth, as a distribution of corpus.""'
The brevity of Code section 664 (b) and the regulations
thereunder belie both the enormous complexity of these rules and
their susceptibility to tax planning. In general, the rules create
a tier system of taxing distributions to the beneficiary, and re-
quire the trustee to keep a running tally of the activities of the
unitrust. These rules bear some resemblance to the earnings and
profits account of a corporation, since that account is also a running
tally and is also used to characterize amounts received by a dis-
tributee. The unitrust tiers, however, provide five categories of
distributions, whereas the earnings and profits account provides
only two.
or by a charitable remainder unitrust shall be considered as having
the following characteristics in the hands of a beneficiary to whom
is paid the annuity described in subsection (d) (1) (A) or the pay-
ment described in subsection (d) (2) (A):
(1) First, as amounts of income (other than gains and
amounts treated as gains, from the sale or other disposition of
capital assets) includible in gross income to the extent of such
income of the trust for the year and such undistributed income
of the trust for prior years;
(2) Second, as a capital gain to the extent of the capital gain
of the trust for the year and the undistributed capital gain of the
trust for prior year;
(3) Third, as other income to the extent of such income of
the trust for the year and such undistributed income of the trust
for prior years; and
(4) Fourth, as a distribution of trust corpus. For purposes of
this section, the trust shall determine the amount of its undis-
tributed capital gain on a cumulative net basis.
Id.
181. Note that Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(d), 35 Fed. Reg. 12468
(1970), adds a fifth tier, short term capital gains, which the Treasury De-
partment has inserted between ordinary income and long term capital gain.
The tier system seems to be based on two assumptions. First,
that the trustee of a unitrust will invest a significant percentage
of unitrust assets in high income yield securities, thus assuring
that a large percentage, if not all, of the distributions to the bene-
ficiary will be taxed as ordinary income. Second, that if highly
appreciated property is transferred to the unitrust, the sale of
the property will generate so much capital gain that, even if the
proceeds are fully invested in tax-exempt securities, all of the
capital gains will have to be used up before the beneficiary can
receive any tax-free income. While not exhaustive, the following
example is intended to question the effectiveness of these assump-
tions and illuminate some problems raised by the characterization
rules.
The grantor own 10,000 shares of ABC stock which he pur-
chased twenty years ago for $3.00 per share. ABC stock is now
widely traded and selling around $300.00 per share. It pays an
annual dividend of $3.00 or one percent per share. The grantor is
married but has no children. He is sixty years old and his wife is
fifty-eight. Thus, the grantor has a $3,000,000 investment, with
a $30,000 basis, and a dividend yield of $30,000 per year. Assume
that on December 1, 1970, the grantor transfers $1,000,000 of ABC
stock to a unitrust, reserving a six percent annual payout for
his life and upon his death the payout goes to his wife, if she sur-
vives him, and upon the death of both the grantor and his wife
the remainder is to be transferred to an organization described
in section 170(c). Assume the unitrust agreement provides for a
taxable year ending on January 31; quarterly valuations to be
made on April 30, July 31, October 31 and January 31; and dis-
tributions to be made as soon as is reasonably possible after these
dates.
Since the trustee must account for any income, gains, or
losses 8 2 of the unitrust assets, he must establish the basis and
182. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(d) (1) (i), 35 Fed. Reg. 12468 (1970),
provides that an ordinary loss for the current year may be used to reduce
undistributed ordinary income for prior years and any excess may be car-
ried forward indefinitely to reduce ordinary income for future years.
These same principles are applied with respect to short-term and long-term
capital gains (without the section 1211 limitation) and also to other income.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(d) (2), 35 Fed. Reg. 12468 (1970), pro-
vides that any expenses of the unitrust which are deductible in determining
taxable income are allocated to the category to which the expenses are rea-
sonably related. Expenses that are not reasonably related to any category
are allocated among all positive categories-that is, among categories
showing gain. Any private foundation taxes and any taxes for unrelated
business taxable income are allocated to corpus.
Any expense allocated to corpus simply disappears. One might ask,
however, when an expense is reasonably related to corpus if a unitrust is a
single fund without distinction between income and corpus. This question
is certain to arise with respect to trustee's commissions. Under prior law,
generally income commissions were charged to income, and principal com-
missions were charged to principal. This distinction is simply not workable
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holding period for the contributed property. The basis of the ABC
stock ($30,000) is apportioned between the stock retained by the
grantor and the stock transferred to the unitrust. Therefore,
the unitrust holds $1,000,000 worth of ABC stock with a basis of
$10,000.183 The holding period of the stock is tacked,'1 4 so that the
trustee can sell the ABC stock at any time and still generate long-
term capital gains.
The trustee is required to make a distribution to the grantor
as of January 31, 1971. Since the first taxable year of the unitrust
is a short taxable year, the amount distributed must be pro-rated.1 18
Roughly, 2/12 x 6% times $1,000,000 or 2/12 times $60,000 or $10,000.
If the ABC stock does not pay a dividend between Decem-
ber 1 and January 31, the trustee will have to either sell enough
ABC stock to make the payout or distribute $10,000 worth of
ABC stock in kind to the grantor.18 6 Assume that the trustee
sells $100,000 worth of ABC stock on January 31, 1971, and dis-
with the unitrust, because the beneficiary is likely to receive distributions of
both income and principal. Since the trustee's commission would reduce
the amount of ordinary income if allocated to income, the Service is likely
to resist such an allocation. But, it would not be unreasonable to view all
trustee's commissions as being "current" and, therefore, chargeable against
ordinary income.
183. This result is based on a fair market value allocation:
.1,000,0003,000,000 X 30,000 = 10,0003,000,000
If however, the grantor can separately identify the basis for the ABC stock
transferred to the unitrust, then the unitrust would take the stock with the
identified basis.
184. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1015(a) would mandate a transferred
basis. Section 1223 (2) provides generally for a tacked holding period for
property "however acquired," if the property has the same basis in the
hands of the transferee as it had in the hands of the transferor.
185. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(e), 35 Fed. Reg. 12469 (1970). See
text accompanying notes 146-47 supra.
186. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(d) (5), 35 Fed. Reg. 12469 (1970)
permits the trustee to distribute unitrust assets in kind to meet the required
payout. The proposed regulations set forth the following example to il-
lustrate the effect of a distribution in kind:
On January 1, 1971 X created a charitable remainder annuity
trust under which X is to receive $5,000 per year. During 1971,
the trust earns $500 of ordinary income. On December 31, 1971,
the trust distributed cash of $500 and property having a fair mar-
ket value of $4,500 and a basis of $2,200. The trust is deemed to
have realized a capital gain of $2,300. X shall treat the distribution
of $5,000 as being ordinary income of $500, capital gain of $2,300
and trust corpus of $2,200. The basis of the property is $4,500 in
the hands of X.
Note that if the grantor put in the clause requiring the trustee To pay
the beneficiary the lesser of trust income or the required payout, the
grantor would not receive a distribution for this short taxable year. See
notes 131-33 and the accompanying text supra.
tributes $10,000 cash to the grantor on February 15, 1971.187
The unitrust in the example above generated $99,000 in long-
term capital gains;"8 8 therefore, the entire $10,000 received by the
grantor is treated as a long-term capital gain to the grantor. The
unitrust would then show an undistributed long-term capital gain
of $89,000 ($99,000 generated on sale of ABC stock less $10,000 taxed
to the grantor). The following chart indicates the operation of
the unitrust during its fiscal year ending January 31, 1972.
Undistributed
Long-Term
Dividends Interest 8 9  Capital Gain Quarterly Payouts9 °




The grantor would have received $60,000 in distributions dur-
ing the taxable year of the unitrust ending January 31, 1972, and
he would include this in his gross income for 1972, even though
$44,500 of this amount was received by the grantor in 1971.191 Of
the $60,000, $14,400 would be treated as ordinary income 192 and
$45,600 would be treated as long-term capital gain. Note that the
low yield stock is really a benefit to the beneficiary because it per-
mits him to receive much of the annual distribution as long-
term capital gain. If the trustee had immediately sold all of the
ABC stock, he would have done three things: first, he would
have generated $990,000 of long-term capital gain and effectively
prevented the beneficiary from ever realizing any tax-exempt in-
come;1 93 second, if he then purchases high yield securities, he
would prevent the beneficiary from realizing any long-term capi-
tal gains; and third, he would deprive the grantor's wife of any
187. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3 (a) (4), 35 Fed. Reg. 12471 (1970).
Payments made within two and one-half months after the end of a taxable
year are considered as made within that taxable year.
188. $100,000 amount realized less $1,000 allocated basis. Expenses of
sale are not considered.
189. The cash will not earn interest for the entire year because the
unitrust instrument requires quarterly distributions.
190. Assume that any fluctuations in the quarterly payout result from
fluctuations in value of the ABC stock.
191. See notes 144-45 and accompanying text supra.
192. Presumably the grantor would be able to qualify for the $100
dividend exclusion provided by section 116. However, neither section
664(b) nor the proposed regulations expressly provide for the exclusion.
193. The tier system is apparently designed for this situation. The
capital gains account would be reduced by roughly $60,000 per year. There-
fore, the grantor or his wife will have to live roughly seventeen years just
to exhaust the capital gains. If the trustee didn't invest all the proceeds
in tax-exempt securities, but invested in ordinary income producing prop-
erty, the ordinary income from this property would characterize the distri-
butions prior to using the capital gain. This, of course, will lengthen the
period that the grantor or his wife will have to live before they can enjoy
any tax free income.
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benefit she might derive from a step up in the basis of the uni-
trust assets should the grantor predecease his wife.'
94
If grantor had substantial amounts of other income, of which
the trustee took cognizance, the trustee might consider selling
some of the ABC stock and purchasing tax-exempt securities.195
However, as noted above, the sale of ABC stock would generate
large amounts of long-term capital gains. Because of the tier sys-
tem of section 664(b), the grantor would have to live many years
to use up these capital gains before getting to the "other income".
Thus, some incentive is provided to contribute less highly appre-
ciated securities to the unitrust; thereby permitting the trustee to
purchase tax-exempt securities without generating large amounts
of capital gain.
Assume that the grantor dies in March of 1972. Depending
on the unitrust agreement, the last payment of the grantor would
be either the last payment he received while alive or a payment
received by his estate and pro-rated to the day of his death. The
grantor's wife would then begin receiving the quarterly distribu-
tions until her death. However, the basis of the unitrust assets
would be stepped up. 9" With the appreciation of the unitrust as-
sets removed, the tax effects of distributions to the wife are en-
tirely different than they were to the grantor.
With the appreciation in the ABC stock eliminated, several
options are open to the trustee. He could retain the ABC stock;
he could purchase tax-exempt securities; or, he could purchase
other growth stock. He need not, however, purchase high-income
securities. As long as the value of unitrust assets demonstrates
194. See notes 196-97 infra.
195. This raises an interesting question. To what extent should the
trustee consider the income tax picture of the beneficiary? It is sug-
gested that as long as the interest of the beneficiary and the remainderman
are equally served, as they would be with solid growth stock, the trustee
must consider the taxation of distributions to the beneficiary.
196. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014(a) provides that the basis of prop-
erty in the hands of a person acquiring the property from a decedent shall
be the fair market value of the property at the date of the decedent's
death. "Person," of course, includes a trust. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 7701. Section 1014(b) defines the phrase "property acquired from a de-
cedent"; this definition includes property acquired from the decedent by
reason of death, form of ownership, or other conditions, if by reason thereof
the property is required to be included in the decedent's gross estate. INT.
Rsv. CODE of 1954, § 1014 (b) (9). Thus, the unitrust acquired the property
from the decedent by reason of "other conditions," and by reason thereof
the property is included in the grantor's gross estate as a retained life es-
tate pursuant to section 2036. The grantor's estate, of course, would get
an estate tax charitable deduction pursuant to section 2055 for the value
of the remainder interest passing to charity.
steady growth the trustee should not be required to purchase in-
come producing investments. The fact that the beneficiary receives
tax-free or capital-gain distributions does not diminish the re-
mainder interest. Nor is it contrary to the legislative intent of
correlating the charitable deduction with the amount received by
the charity.
0 7
Thus, the assumptions which underlie the tier system operate
to produce ordinary income and to prevent the receipt of tax free
income only if the trustee is government oriented. If, however,
the trustee can demonstrate solid investment growth, the unitrust
concept permits the trustee to consider the tax effect of the dis-
tributions to the beneficiary.
Contrary to the broad assumptions which surrounded the en-
actment of the Tax Reform Act's charitable remainder trust pro-
visions, the old charitable remainder trusts did not enjoy any fa-
vored status, nor is the new unitrust a crippling change in the area
of charitable giving. While the charitable remainder trust was
easy to create prior to the Reform Act, there was no certainty that
the intended benefits would follow. The new annuity trust and
unitrust rules, although complex, offer hope that Congress has
provided a reliable method for the grantor seeking a charitable de-
duction for the contribution of a remainder interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 has modified most basic rules
governing the creation, modification, and inclusion of trusts un-
der federal tax provisions. Despite the lack of rational discus-
sion of the merits in the congressional hearings, charitable trusts
are treated as section 501(c) (3) organizations and have been in-
cluded within the private foundation definition of Code section
509(a). Moreover, split-interest charitable remainder trusts are
now subject to the private foundation provisions enumerated in
section 4947 (a) (2).
Though a variety of charitable organizations should be able
to qualify for the section 509 (a) (3) exemption, the Treasury De-
partment is zealously pursuing a collision course with congres-
sional intent in order to preclude trust use of the satellite ex-
emption. An active participation requirement has been included in
the proposed regulations to accomplish this Treasury Depart-
ment goal. The treasury regulations also establish a series of
197. Even though some of the distributions may be characterized as a
return of principal, this does not defeat the much sought after correlation.
For example, with a seven percent required payout, the grantor's charitable
deduction is computed on the assumption that some principal will be repaid
to the beneficiary. Therefore, if $100,000 is transferred to the unitrust, the
charity has no reason to expect $100,000 when the interest of the beneficiary
terminates, and, the charitable deduction allowed when the unitrust is cre-
ated is reduced proportionately.
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overly restrictive tests inappropriate for charitable organizations.
The Treasury Department has not only defeated congressional
intent, but has stifled its own self-proclaimed desire-the tighten-
ing of deduction provisions to prevent abuse by wealthy donors.
It is submitted that the Treasury Department should recon-
sider its interpretation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The pro-
posed regulations should more accurately reflect congressional in-
tent and better implement the equitable aims for which the Act
was promulgated. In lieu of reasonable revision, the Act requires
charitable donors to create or amend their trust instruments as
public charities. In all probability, the strictions embodied in the
Act and proposed regulations will enhance the liklihood of abuse
by disreputable donors, and place undue administrative hardships
on honest ones.
Though the charitable remainder trust also underwent revision
in the Act, the resulting effect on donors and practitioners is sub-
stantially different. It was erroneously assumed that the chari-
table remainder trust was the best method of assuring tax deduc-
tions to charitable organizations, and that replacing such trusts
with the tripartite qualifications of the unitrust, pooled income fund,
and annuity trust would destroy the economic and administra-
tive viability of those organizations. However, the favored tax
status of charitable remainders was merely ostensible, since such
trusts were continually questioned and attacked by the Treasury
Department.
Although the annuity trust and pooled income fund are strictly
limited in their use to charitable institutions, it is submitted that
the unitrust, though subject to complex rules of the Act and
regulations, provides a better tool than the charitable remainder
trust. The discussion contained in this Article provides an over-
view of the best methods of implementing the unitrust. If utilized
with care, the untrust may become a source of the equity which
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